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ABSTRACT 
An Exploratory Study of The Factors Affecting Hospital Performance: Safety, Clinical Care, 
Patient Experience, Efficiency and Cost 
by 
Shevon Lewis 
December 2020 
Chair: Subhashish Samaddar 
Major Academic Unit: Doctorate in Business Administration 
Healthcare systems have interrelated, collaborative, and interdependent elements from 
the human aspects to facilities geared towards providing people with medical care. This 
dissertation explores healthcare reform in the context of hospital value-based purchasing 
programs. Hospital performance is a byproduct of a hospital’s characteristics, demonstrated 
through organizational behavior—a key driver towards an institution’s overall success and 
sustainability. Hospital value-based purchasing (VBP) program is a Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid services (CMS) initiative that rewards acute-care hospitals with incentivized payments 
for the quality care provided to Medicare beneficiaries ((HHS), 2017). The program adopts a 
philosophy of measurement and promotes an appraisal mechanism to provide equitable 
reimbursement for patient care; however, the program has had a marginal influence on hospital 
performance. The study aimed to assess hospital performance ‘VBP program’ and provide a 
prescriptive guide to decision-makers. Secondary data from 2,786 acute care hospitals across the 
united states, which offers inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries, has been used. Statistical 
significance was measured by applying bivariate and multivariate regression. The findings 
 xiv 
showed that teaching intensity, hospital size, and case mix index had an impact on hospital 
performance. 
INDEX WORDS: Hospital performance, Business performance, Organizational Structure, 
Safety, Clinical Care, Patient Experience, Efficiency and Cost; Teaching Intensity, 
Hospital Size, Case Mix Index, Value Base Purchasing, Value Base Care, Healthcare 
Reform, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
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I CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I.1 Hospital Value-Based Purchasing and Quality Healthcare 
The cost and quality of healthcare have always been a source of contention. The 
healthcare system in the United States of America have been characterised by sharply rising 
costs and lower quality compared with other industrialized countries (Kavanagh K., 2012). 
Disparities in needs among people due to the recurrence of infectious diseases and the rise in 
chronic diseases increases the need for specialized treatment and long-term care.  Defining the 
quality of medical care seems to be almost as elusive as variations in health needs or resources 
that do not explain satisfactorily significant variations per population rates of use of services 
(Lohr, 1988).  Discussions on healthcare reform should highlight the need for population-based 
approaches in ensuring consistent quality care for chronic patients, which have become 
increasingly popular and funding for pilot projects to test alternative ways of advancing greater 
returns on healthcare spending (Greenberg, Dudley, & Ferris, 2010). 
Healthcare advancements by contributors have advanced access to health insurance, 
innovation in medical research, disease control, technology, and performance-based rewards. 
“Pay-for-performance” is an umbrella term for initiatives aimed at improving the quality, 
efficiency, and overall value of healthcare (James, 2012). Value-based purchasing (VBP) has 
been a widely favored strategy in the improvement of the US healthcare system, which 
originated during the 1990s among large employers and business coalitions (Chee, Ryan, & 
Wasfy, 2016). VBP began with the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 as a subset of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting (IQR) program 
(Raso, 2013) and was signed into law as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
of 2010 and implemented in 2012. The program aimed at incentivization of inpatient providers to 
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deliver high value, as opposed to high-volume, healthcare (Blumenthal, 2013). Value-Based 
Purchasing Scores track hospital performance in four quality measures (Waldron, 2019): 
• Clinical Care (25%) 
• Efficiency and Cost Reduction (25%) 
• Patient and Caregiver-Centered Experience of Care/Care Coordination (25%) 
• Safety (25%) 
Hospitals payment are based on three factors (Waldron, 2019): 
• Achievement points: How well a hospital performs on each of the selected measures  
• Improvement points: How much it has improved on each measure compared to the 
baseline period  
• Consistency points:  Rewards hospitals that have scores above the national 50th 
percentile in all eight dimensions of the HCAHPS survey 
I.2 Statement of the Problem 
The institutionalization of the Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) program in hospitals 
across the United States has had major consequences for how hospitals function and operate. 
Statistics have shown that the quality of healthcare has declined, but costs have risen, which may 
be a direct consequence of a high rate of competition in order to obtain insurance financing. The 
purpose of this study was to assess hospital performance ‘Value-Based Purchasing Program’ and 
to provide a prescriptive guide to decision-makers through the analysis of existing operating 
system practices in hospitals across the United States. 
The U.S. healthcare system operates as a combination of different health insurance 
programs. It is only recently that legislation has enacted the provision of healthcare coverage for 
nearly all citizens (The U.S. Health Care System: An International Perspective, 2016); even so, 
many Americans today are still without health insurance making access to adequate healthcare 
challenging. Reports have stated that in 2014, 283.2 million people in the U.S., 89.6 percent had 
some type of health insurance, with 66 percent of workers covered by a private health insurance 
plan. Among the insured, 115.4 million people, 36.5 percent of the population, received coverage 
through the U.S. government in 2014 through Medicare (50.5 million), Medicaid (61.65 million), 
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and/or Veterans Administration or other military care (14.14 million) (people may be covered by 
more than one government plan). Conversely, nearly 32.9 million people in the U.S. had no 
health insurance at the end of 2014 (The U.S. Health Care System: An International Perspective, 
2016). Only 2019 saw what can be described as a marginal change with a population of 330 
million of which 242 million have health insurance, mainly from employment-based plans, and 
estimates that the number of people without health insurance will increase from 30 million in 
2019 to 35 million in 2029 (Federal Health Insurance Coverage for People under the age of 65: 
2019 to 2029). 
 
Figure 1: US Sources of Healthcare Coverage of 2019 
Accompanying the ghastly prediction of health insurance coverage, reports from 
numerous media outlets and politically motivated media, paints a contradictory picture of 
success, on one hand; while, on the other, medical technical advances and desperation, led by 
allegations of high medical care costs, defined in The Guardian article Millions of Americans – 
as many as 25% of the population – are delaying getting medical help because of skyrocketing 
costs (Sainato, 2019). Other contributing factors have been identified such as the ageing of 
populations, increased public demand and expectations, personal income growth, rising prices of 
physician and hospital services (e.g., labour costs), and inefficiencies in the organization and 
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payment of care (Corinna Sorenson, 2013). Dr. F. Randy Vogenberg underscored the role of 
consumerism and populism in the current approach to healthcare as he pointed out that both are 
rooted in a labor-group movement directed against big business and machine-based politics to 
champion the 'common person’, and consumerism increases the consumption of goods is 
economically beneficial, and that consumers should be protected from inferior, dangerous, and 
unfair pricing of goods. (Vogenberg, 2019). Both consumerism and populism are at the core of 
the hospital value-based purchasing program, which emphasizes the need to provide quality 
services to patients with a focus on value for money, especially in the light of cost increases. 
As the healthcare system concentrated on a more customer-centric approach, the 
implementation of the hospital VBP program as a strategy of medical management appeared 
prudent to encourage the provision of higher quality patient care. However, as stated earlier, the 
differences in medical needs vary, resulting in physicians concentrating on delivering complex 
services with a desire to do so in large volumes. Higher care intensity does not necessarily result 
in higher quality of care and can even be harmful (James, 2012). A study by Meyer, 2005 funded 
by The Commonwealth Fund, found that top-performing hospitals are distinguished from others 
in the following ways: 
• they develop the right culture for quality to flourish. 
• they attract and retain the right people to promote quality. 
• they devise and update the right in-house processes for quality improvement; and 
• they give staff the right tools to do the job (Meyer, 2005) . 
It is, therefore, essential to analyse the current state of Hospital Performance against Value-based 
Purchasing. 
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I.3 Research question and Objectives 
What factors affect hospital performance? 
• To examine the factors that contribute to hospital performance. 
• To assess whether value-based purchasing improves hospital performance.  
• To provide a guide to healthcare decision-makers and business associates. 
• To add to the body of knowledge on VBP and healthcare reform. 
I.4 Motivation for study  
High cost, Low quality.  Compared to other developed nations, the U.S. healthcare 
services only recently in the last eight years transitioned to a patient-centered 
approach. As such, the introduction of the Value-based Hospital Program was a 
reasonable attempt to achieve patient satisfaction. However, there are considerable 
disadvantages to the program spearheaded by the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. 
Organizational Inefficiencies. Primary care doctors and nurses are crucial to 
hospital performance and patient care. Short staffing of these personnel can lead to 
devaluation of care provided. Value-based purchasing program serve acute-care 
institutions that often handle large volumes of diverse patients that require specified 
treatment and care. Another factor to be considered is lengthy hospital stays, or 
delayed discharges which can result in putting urgent care and inbound patients at 
risk. High readmission rates Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, avoidable 
readmissions often occur because inpatient care quality and care coordination is poor 
(Becker, 2016). Poor communication is at the root of poor patient flow, long stays 
and high readmission rates. Inadequate communication between health care teams, 
such as communication between physicians, nurses and other medical staff has an 
impact on the bottom line (Becker, 2016).  
Healthcare Access. Americans today are still without health insurance making 
access to healthcare challenging. Those who have health insurance may be subjected 
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to cost cutting measures imposed by insurers as not all healthcare plans meet the 
needs of patients which poses a problem in accessing valuable healthcare. 
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II CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of the research was to provide a comprehensive review of the literature and 
industry practices in hospital performance in relation to value-based purchasing programs. In 
reviewing Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) literature and its effects on hospital performance 
(HP), the study included publications from over 15 years from 2008 to 2019. The relevance of 
the timeline should be noted as it parallels the trajectory of the establishment of VBP program in 
hospitals across the United States, through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), signed into law as part of the 2010 patient protection and affordable care act 
(BLUMENTHAL, 2013). The search span across various health related keywords with strong 
emphasis on the following: value-based purchasing in hospitals, incentivized performance, 
patient care, patient experience, patient safety, U.S hospitals, patient outcome, clinical care, 
hospital performance, nursing care, physician/doctor care and efficiency and cost.  
II.1 Process of Thematic Categorization 
The process of synthesis entailed selecting articles relevant to the study’s aim and 
purpose and a classification exercise developed from emerging themes found throughout the 
literature. The primary source of investigation was hospital value-based purchasing related 
journals such as the Journal of Community Health, Journal of Hospital Medicine, and Health 
Affairs in which the Georgia State University Library databases was leveraged through the use of 
JSTOR, SAGE Journal, EBSCOhost, Wiley InterScience and Google Scholar. Table 1. below 
provides the working definition that guided the flow of literature review.  
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Table 1: Definition of Thematic Areas 
Themes  Definition  
Value in Healthcare  In Healthcare, value is defined as the patient health outcomes 
achieved per dollar spent (Porter, What is Value in Health Care, 
2010). 
• Safety: the prevention of harm to patients. 
• Patient Experience: the sum of all interactions, shaped by an 
organization’s culture that influence patient perceptions, 
across the continuum of care. 
• Clinical Care: The clinical consultation is when the 
diagnosis is made correctly or incorrectly. 
• Efficiency and Cost: cost of care associated with a specific 
level of quality of care. 
The Donabedian Model   A conceptual model that provides a framework for examining 
health services and evaluating quality of health care. 
Incentive Reform "Pay-for-performance" is an umbrella term for initiatives aimed at 
improving the quality, efficiency, and overall value of health care.  
Value-Based Purchasing 
Programs 
The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program is a Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) initiative that rewards 
acute-care hospitals with incentive payments for the quality care 
provided to Medicare beneficiaries. 
Impact of Value-based 
Purchasing Programs 
An indication of the improvement of quality of care, e.g.  FY 2019 
increase 38.1 from FY 2018 37.4. 
 
II.2 Value in Healthcare  
In any field, improving performance and accountability depends on having a shared goal 
that unites the interests and activities of all stakeholders. In most fields, the preeminent goal is 
value. In healthcare, the days of business as usual are over. Around the world, healthcare systems 
have struggled with rising costs and uneven quality despite the hard work of well-intentioned, 
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well-trained clinicians (Porter M. E., 2013). Value as the key concept in healthcare systems plays 
a key role in medical practice and an increased importance of patient centeredness (Marzorati & 
Pravettoni, 2017). The concept of value refers to the output achieved relative to the cost incurred 
in which, value is defined as the patient health outcomes achieved per dollar spent (Porter, 2010). 
Despite the overarching significance of value in health care, access to care is a basic requirement 
of any healthcare system, but access per se does not constitute value and it has not been the 
central focus (Porter, 2010). We must move away from a supply-driven healthcare system 
organized around what physicians do and toward a patient-centered system organized around 
what patients need (Marzorati & Pravettoni, 2017).  
The success of traditional systems depends on the ability to decompose and recompose 
elements of the system (Rouse, 2008). Consider the large number of players or "agents" involved 
in the healthcare system, and recent attempts to reform healthcare have tended, in effect, to 
pursue the lowest acceptable cost of health care for the American population (Rouse, 2008), 
which made the reformation of healthcare a necessary component. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that each type of agent seeks to serve its interests and provide its customers with quality 
products and services (Rouse, 2008), hence the justification for incentive programs as value-
based purchases. However, the failures to adopt value as the central goal in health care and to 
measure value are arguably the most serious failures of the medical community (Porter, 2010). 
The current delivery system was not organized around value for patients. However, it rewards 
those who shift costs, bargain away, capture someone else’s revenues, and bill for more services, 
not those who deliver the most value (Porter, 2009).  
One of the central issues in designing a VBP program is the definition of value 
(Tompkins, Higgins, & Ritter, 2009). In the healthcare market, value to the purchaser is quality 
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in relation to the cost of care: value can increase by improving the quality of services in return 
for the same payments made to providers or by lowering the payments made for the same quality 
of care. It is therefore prudent to look at the various value-based measures of performance to 
understand the impact each has on hospital performance. 
II.3 The Donabedian Model  
The model proposed by Avedis DONABEDIAN has been a widely accepted method to 
design the main dimensions of healthcare quality, define by Structure-Process-Outcomes. (El 
Haj, Lamrini, & Rais, 2013); which takes into consideration all challenges that healthcare 
institutions have to face due to their poorly designed processes (El Haj, Lamrini, & Rais, 2013). 
Donabedian, 2005 three components approach for evaluating the quality of care underpins 
measurement for improvement. The three components are structure, process, and outcomes:  
 
Figure 2: Donabedian Model 
Donabedian believed that structure measures have an effect on process measures, which in 
turn affect outcome measures (Academy, 2012). The model focuses on the measurement of 
quality and highlights the follow: 
Structure measures. these reflect the attributes of the service/provider such as staff to 
patient ratios and operating times of the service. (access issue for patients to receive 
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appropriate care - if there is a shortage in medical/administrative staff, equipment 
shortage, lack of space, time, funding/financial issues). 
Process measures. Reflects the way systems and processes work to deliver a desired 
outcome. (If there is an issue in the process, this can affect diagnosis, treatment example 
wrong medication etc., and other services such respect to patients, privacy adherence.) 
Outcome measures. these reflect the impact on the patient and demonstrate the end 
result of your improvement work and whether it has ultimately achieved the aim(s) set. 
(This speaks to the following results:  Objective measures such as blood work showing 
infection – clinical care, Subjective measures such as a patient quality of life after 
treatment/hospital discharge and group level such as population statistics). 
The Donabedian model is a measuring tool. 
 Avedis Donabedian has been conscious that it is important to assess the quality of care and 
services offered to “Patients” in order to improve the healthcare quality (El Haj, Lamrini, & Rais, 
2013).  
II.4 Reform 
Healthcare in general, more specifically healthcare provided by hospitals in the United 
States of America has been fraught with a myriad of complex, interrelated, entrenched, and not 
easily resolved problems (Bond, 2013). Some of the problems of the American healthcare system 
are knowledge asymmetry, agency problems, lack of price transparency, and biased selection of 
patients (Bond, 2013). The challenges with healthcare have been given recurrent attention in 
various mediums and generally recognized by the various stakeholders (Bond, 2013). In this 
regard, patience, private insurers, employees, and Medicare have continued to make the call for 
the establishment of further incentives. These incentives are geared towards enhancing the 
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quality of care, decreasing utilization, and improving overall (Bond, 2013).  This call for 
incentives can be arguably well intentioned to ameliorating healthcare for all stakeholders.  
At this juncture, the point must be vehemently made that while incentives can be a huge 
impetus for stakeholders' positive action, it is not without challenges. Incentives have been 
shown to affect response from payers, patients, and the various health care workers (Bond, 
2013). Notwithstanding, the design and application of incentives to a complex and heterogeneous 
healthcare system have challenges. Healthcare comprises various stakeholders, with varying 
levels of power and sensibilities to incentives, thus being an effective motivating force toward a 
particular behavior. To be more specific, the incentive that works for doctors might be repulsive 
for the insurer. What incites the patient towards a particular behavior might be counter to 
Medicare. The suite of incentives must be tailored to the various stakeholders. Even more jarring 
has been achieving optimality; these differently tailored incentives have coexisted and had 
complementarity in the healthcare ecosystem (Bond, 2013). A tall, challenging, and arguably 
elusive ask. 
The challenge to design and implement the incentives is not the only problem. An even 
greater problem is that incentives might create the opposite of the desired outcome and result in a 
distortion of the market (Bond, 2013). Using an analogy of candy and kids’, mom gives the kid 
candy if he promises to behavior, it works beautifully in first couple of instances. However, what 
happens when the kid demands more candy, something thing else in addition to candy, tires of 
candy and can get candy at his friend’s house without having to behave. The previously 
described scenario though simplistic illustrate the challenge with incentives and raises the issue 
of sustainability. In addition, in the literature it was delineated that: 
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The marginal impact of an incentive for any actor in the health care system will depend in 
part on its relationship to existing salary and wealth. Thus, reason would suggest that a 
$5,000 bonus payout would be far more meaningful to a nurse making $60,000 than to a 
physician making $200,000 (Bond, 2013). 
Intricately linked to this argument is that even though an existing incentive is to have 
20% of executive pay based on performance. Any binding or definitive guidelines are absent in 
terms of safe maximums or conversely effective minimums for the various workers in health care  
(Bond, 2013)Another undesirable challenge with potentially deleterious impact is that incentives 
would often to be synchronized. The performance at an individual level, group level, and wider 
health care level has often been linked to being more explicit. This raises whether the incentive 
will be paid when an individual target has been realized vis-à-vis when the tied triggers require 
all targets at the various levels for any incentive to be paid (Bond, 2013). The respective impact 
of the absence of an incentive linkage to individual performance can be frustrating, while the 
linkage of incentives to the wider organizational performance can be demotivating (Bond, 2013). 
Moreover, as previously alluded to in the metaphor with the kid and candy, demotivation is 
likely to set in when incentive mechanisms call for continuous advancement. Considering that, 
observations of the healthcare system's existing incentives delineate that gains in quality and cost 
tend to overtime. Furthermore, it must highlight that mechanisms that focus on improvement 
over time tend to be skewed towards the healthcare workers. In contrast, fluctuations in the 
number may be skewed in favor of the hospital or healthcare network, which is usually in charge 
of receiving and issuing incentives (Bond, 2013). Another negative impact of incentive reform is 
that it raises ethical dilemmas. An incentive may become so effective that it causes selection bias 
in the healthcare system. Selection bias because patients who are deemed less non-compliant or 
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are less than healthy by exclusion, so that incentive-linked targets are not negatively affected. 
The aforesaid quintessence is portrayed by the success of the health maintenance organization 
(HMO) model. According to this model, whereby the provider takes the risk for most of the care, 
most of the patients are employed persons and their families that benefit from insurance, so there 
is an exclusion of highly complex and highly risky patients (Bond, 2013). Also, in the new ACO 
model, which is analogous to the HMO model as it concerns shard risk and reward, strong 
financial rewards may induce health workers to be complicit in selection bias. 
Solutions to these problems have included projects such the Acute Care Episode (ACE) 
demonstration project in which provider bonuses were capped 25 percent of physicians’ 
Medicare rate in order that the incentives would reward clear cost savings instead of growing or 
reducing the volume of patients (Bond, 2013). Another possible solution is to exclude some team 
members from the incentive system. These team members could therefore be designated as 
conflict-of-interest mediators and be used at the integrated system level (Bond, 2013). 
Incentives based solely on financial terms may not be effective and have limited appeal 
(Flodgren et al, 2011). Seeing that financially driven incentives may eclipse intrinsic motivation, 
erode the social relationship with patients and retard teamwork optimality because of envy and 
competition. Non-financial incentives may have a reward and recognition facet, but lifestyle and 
work flexibility have tremendous appeal. Organizational justice also has been showed to be 
related to favorable performance. Therefore, incentive reform could be more positively impactful 
if it incorporated both financial and non-financial elements (Bond, 2013). It must be 
acknowledged that incentives in the American health care has undergone progressive reform, but 
even further reform is required. Incentive reform in the American healthcare system cannot be 
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seen as a destination but instead as a continuous journey in order to increase the likelihood of 
widespread positive impacts among the various stakeholders.  
II.5 Value-Based Purchasing Programs 
There are numerous VBP pay-for-performance programs both internationally and within the 
United States, encompassing a wide variety of healthcare delivery settings, and implemented by 
both commercial insurance companies and by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(Chee, Ryan, & Wasfy, 2016). Originally, there are 5 original value-based programs; their goal is 
to link provider performance of quality measures to provider payment: 
• End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (ESRD QIP) 
• Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program 
• Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP) 
• Value Modifier (VM) Program (also called the Physician Value-Based Modifier or 
PVBM) 
There are other types of value-based programs that are geared towards measuring other areas in 
healthcare. 
Hospital Acquired Conditions (HAC) Reduction Program (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 2020).Hospitals are rewarded ‘based on the quality of care provided to Medicare 
patients, not just the quantity of services provided’ (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
2020). 
 
The program: 
• Withholds participating hospitals’ Medicare payments by a percentage specified by 
law (2%). 
• Uses the estimated total amount of those reductions to fund value-based incentive 
payments to hospitals based on their performance in the program. 
• Applies the net result of the reduction and the incentive as a claim-by-claim adjustment 
factor to the base operating Medicare severity diagnosis-related group (MS-DRG) 
payment amount for Medicare fee-for-service claims in the fiscal year associated with 
the performance period (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2020). 
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According to the 2016 study, on the state of value-based purchasing program, despite the 
wide implementation of VBP programs their impact has been marginal thus far (Chee, Ryan, & 
Wasfy, 2016). This sentiment was further reinforced by the 2016 review of the literature that 
stated “eleven studies focused on hospitals, mainly on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services HQID program, with 6 studies having good quality and showing modestly positive 
results” (Chee, Ryan, & Wasfy, 2016). 
II.6 The Impact of Value-based Purchasing Programs 
As previously outlined, Value-Based Purchasing are programs (public or private) that 
link financial reimbursement to performance on measures of quality (i.e., structure, process, 
outcomes, access, and patient experience) and cost or resource use (Damberg et al., 2014). 
Healthcare has reoriented towards quality and value, incorporating health outcomes and 
the resources allocated to achieve those outcomes. With healthcare consuming almost one-fifth 
of the U.S. economy, the burden of healthcare expenditures continues to crowd out funds for 
other society essentials such as education, infrastructure, and social security programs (Chee, 
Ryan, & Wasfy, 2016). The overarching goal of this VBP by Medicare is to influence the health 
service offered by the hospital care provider towards high value instead of mainly high volume. 
Although the published evidence from pay-for-performance (P4P) programs implemented by 
private-sector payers between 2000 and 2010 showed mostly modest results in improving 
performance, 3–10 public and private payers have continued to experiment with the use of 
financial incentives as a policy lever to drive improvements in care (Damberg, et al., 2014). 
Damberg et al., review the effects of value-based purchasing programs by examining 
three broad areas, but for the purpose of this study only two will be addressed, namely.  
• Environmental scan of existing value-based purchasing programs: publicly 
available for 129 VBP programs (91 P4P programs, 27 ACOs, and 11 bundled 
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payment programs) sponsored by private health plans, regional collaboratives, 
Medicaid agencies or states, and the federal government. 
• Review of the published evaluation literature on value-based purchasing: 
examined the peer-reviewed published literature for studies that evaluated the 
impact of P4P, ACO, or VBP-type bundled payment programs. 
The study results indicated that there exist inconsistencies across programs and that the 
goals specified by VBP program sponsors were not quantified (Damberg et al., 2014). The 
absence of quantifiable goals for many programs makes it difficult to determine whether 
programs have successfully met their goals (Damberg et al., 2014). Their review of the literature 
showed a relatively narrow set of measures included in VBP programs that are used as the basis 
for differential payments. The measures vary somewhat by the health care settings in which they 
are being deployed and the type of VBP model (Damberg et al., 2014).  
Another noteworthy aspect of Damberg et al. study is a popularly identified challenge is 
that the metrics used by the VBP only address a facet of the provision of the health service 
(Damberg et al., 2014). In addition, it has been advanced that the performance indicators aligned 
to these metrics have not evolved over the decade in response to changing realities (Damberg et 
al., 2014). There is also the inherent issue that there is no universal agreement on what 
constitutes quality or value (Damberg et al., 2014). Closely related to the previously outlined is 
that some of these metrics are not easily quantifiable. Some of the metrics are outside of the 
control of the hospital. A case in point the metric of patient outcome, while there are steps that 
can and should be taken by the hospital towards securing the likelihood of a positive outcome for 
a patient. Those mentioned above can be distinguished from the fact that lifestyle behaviors such 
as diet, exercise, and smoking significantly impact patient outcomes and even patient safety 
(Damberg et al., 2014). There is also a disparity between what Medicare would describe as a 
positive patient experience vis-à-vis what the patients themselves would describe as a positive. 
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Nonetheless, the main thrust of the VBP influence the health service offered by the 
hospital care provider towards high value instead of mainly high volume.  In the last two years 
steps have been taken to improve the program’s performance through streamlining various 
aspects such as that of measuring the Safety domain. In addition, the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MEDPAC) has released a recommendation to Congress that would 
create a new Hospital Value Incentive Program (HVIP) that would merge two programs (Brown, 
2018). HVIP would aim to avoid the disparities in payment adjustments that arise from serving 
different patient populations. With the proposed regulations for 2019, CMS is starting to 
implement this recommendation. HVIP would have four main areas: 
• Readmissions 
• Mortality 
• MSPB 
• Overall patient experience (Brown, 2018). 
Overall, while there have been efforts to streamline the program, the fact remains that ‘under 
VBP, organizations have the potential for upside or downside reimbursement’ (Brown, 2018). ‘If 
organizations fail to meet these thresholds for the measures, they will receive a penalty’ (Brown, 
2018), which puts hospitals under pressure and may potentially hinder hospital performance. 
II.7 Rationale  
It is imperative to look at different aspects of hospital care, specifically; teaching 
intensity, hospital size, and Case Mix Index, and how each impacted the four measures: safety, 
clinical care, patient experience, and efficiency and cost. The Donabedian model of the structure, 
process, and outcome shapes our logic of the quality-of-care process in this study. Hospital size 
and Case Mix index fall under the model's structural component; Teaching intensity falls under 
the process component, and all dependent variables (safety, clinical care, patient experience, and 
efficiency and cost) fall under the outcome component of the model. 
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II.8 Outcomes 
Model 1 –Safety 
Safety is the foundation of good patient care (Vincent, 2010). The IOM defined safety as 
“the prevention of harm to patients (Mitchell, 2008). Emphasis is placed on the system of care 
delivery that (1) prevents errors; (2) learns from the errors that do occur; and (3) is built on a 
culture of safety that involves health care professionals, organizations, and patients (Mitchell, 
2008) 
Medicine has been an inherently risky enterprise; the hopes of benefit and cure are 
always linked to the possibility of harm (Vincent, 2010) 
Patient safety is a problem when hospital care does not yield less readmission, which 
means that patients are at a higher risk. Lowering hospital readmission rates has become a 
primary target for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. However, studies of the 
relationship between adherence to the recommended hospital care processes and readmission 
rates have inconsistent and inconclusive results (Stefan et al., 2012). Dangerous treatments were 
one form of harm. However, hospitals could also be secondary sources of harm, in which 
patients acquired new diseases simply from being in the hospital (Vincent, 2010). 
Model 2 – Clinical Care (Mortality) 
Literature often refers to the quality of care provided when referring to clinical care. The 
key dimensions of quality of health care are individual patients, access, and effectiveness. The 
clinical consultation speaks to the accuracy of a diagnosis, which is crucial to patient safety 
(Caldwell, 2019). Modernization of the healthcare system as a result of physicians are under 
pressure to see more and more patients and to fulfill management perquisites for measuring 
incentive rewards (Caldwell, 2019). Healthcare providers have recognized that clinical 
consultations are a crucial profitable mechanism for their business and have sought to enhance 
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the clinical consultation process and prevent misdiagnosis with substantial patient satisfaction 
and experience (Caldwell, 2019) 
In this study Clinical Care represents the mortality rate at a given facility. In healthcare 
settings, volume can improve clinical quality across a wide range of procedures and conditions 
(Gaynor et al.2005, Hannan 1999, Luft et al. 1990). Clinical process scores in the study assess 
whether “what is known to be ‘good’ medical care has been applied.” This process measures 
whether or not a healthcare provider gives the recommended care to patients with a particular 
condition (Bonfrer et al., 2018). One hypothesis is that teaching hospitals, which care for many 
of the sickest and most vulnerable patients, have continued to employ appropriate readmission 
policies that optimize patient survival irrespective of potential financial penalties (Shahian et al., 
2020). Also, hospitals performing higher numbers of certain surgical operations have 
demonstrated significantly lower operative mortality and morbidity, presumably through 
increased experience and selective referral patterns (Luft, Hunt, and Maerki 1987; Dudley et al. 
2000; Birkmeyer et al. 2002). As such, it was deemed prudent to measure the impact that value-
based purchasing had on clinical care as hospitals aim to maintain the standard.  
Model 3 - Patient Experience  
Patient experience encompasses the range of interactions that patients have with 
healthcare system, including their care from health plans, and from doctors, nurses, and staff in 
hospitals, physician practices, and other health care facilities (Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality). Patient experience has been consistently and positively associated with other 
quality outcomes including patient safety and clinical effectiveness across a wide range of 
studies, and healthcare facilities providing high-quality clinical care tend to have better 
experiences reported by patients (Ahmed, Burt, & Roland, 2014). However, Quality is a multi-
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dimensional concept, and a single indicator does not (and should not) reflect quality in other 
domains (Ahmed, Burt, & Roland, 2014). 
There has been an increasing acknowledgement that patient experience is now a top priority for 
healthcare leaders. However, in the 2009 Health Leaders Media Patient Experience Leadership 
Survey 3 discovered that when it comes to defining patient experience, there are widely 
divergent views within the healthcare industry (Wolf, Niederhauser, Marshburn, & LaVela, 
2014). The terms patient experience, patient perspective, patient reports, patient perception and 
patient satisfaction are often used interchangeably, but patient experience, the most commonly 
used (Ahmed, Burt, & Roland, 2014) for the purpose of this paper we will adopt the definition of 
the Beryl Institute’s current definition for patient experience – “the sum of all interactions, 
shaped by an organization’s culture that influence patient perceptions, across the continuum of 
care” (Wolf, Niederhauser, Marshburn, & LaVela, 2014). 
In measuring patient experience various factors must be considered for example, doctor–
patient communication could be evaluated by external raters viewing videotapes of consultations 
to score the quality of the interaction, and access to primary care can be measured by using 
‘mystery shopper’ approaches to measure the proportion of times a request for a particular 
appointment time could be met (Ahmed, Burt, & Roland, 2014). All measurements have their 
limitations, as in the case of patient experience, a multi-dimensional indicator that speaks highly 
to the quality of care and services in order to determine the overall performance of the hospital. 
Model 4 – Efficiency and Cost 
The AQA defines efficiency of care as the cost of care associated with a specific level of quality 
of care (Russo and Adler). The Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary (MSPB) Measure shows 
whether Medicare spends more, less, or about the same for an episode of care (“episode”) at a 
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specific hospital compared to all hospitals nationally. This measure evaluates hospitals’ costs 
compared to the costs of the national median (or midpoint) hospital. This measure takes into 
account important factors like patient age and health status (risk adjustment) and geographic 
payment differences (payment-standardization). 
Healthcare systems capable of ensuring equitable and efficient services are essentials for a 
general and continuous improvement of the population’s health status (Asandului, Roman, & 
Fatulescu, 2014). Our health care system is characterized by high and rising healthcare costs as 
well as gaps in quality, safety, equity, and access (Fraser, Encinosa, & Glied, 2008). Most of the 
current hospital performance measures do not identify the relationship between quality and cost 
of care and, therefore, are not health care efficiency measures, as a result measurements of 
physician efficiency do not identify the relationship between quality and cost of care (Russo and 
Adler). According to the American Quality Alliance (AQA), cost of care is a measure of the total 
health care spending, which includes the total use of resources and unit prices for health care 
services provided to a patient or a population over time (Russo and Adler). In rewarding 
hospitals for differential value — quality combined with cost — it is crucial to create definitive 
characteristics, even though health value may in fact have varied agility. 
II.9 Assessment of Quality of Care - Structure & Process 
Teaching Intensity 
Historically, teaching hospitals have been pioneers in innovation in medicine, and there is 
no reason to assume that they cannot face the challenges presented by value-based purchasing 
programs. However, there does exist the perception that the individual health practitioners 
working in the health care system, and particularly the junior members of teams, are more likely 
to undermine rather than build patient safety (Cook et al., 1998). Senior medical practitioners are 
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seen as leaders and key determinants of the quality and safety of medical services (Scott, 2009). 
Contemporary application of safety science and quality improvement methods is moving towards 
redesigning systems by reviewing, adapting and changing healthcare processes, technology and 
environments to prevent, minimize or recover errors that could lead to patient harm (Erbault et 
al., 2003; Glickman et al., 2007).                                                                                                                       
This study defines “junior doctor” as a newly qualified medical practitioner who has 
recently graduated from medical school (1 to 3 years postgraduate) and is employed in a clinical 
post under the supervision of a senior medical specialist located at a hospital or general practice. 
Junior doctors’ currency of training brings contemporary and up-to-date knowledge of standards 
of “best practice” and less deviation from such standards (e.g. Choudhry et al., 2005). Junior 
doctors are in an ideal position to ask questions, identify and understand deviation from optimal 
practice because of their contemporary scientific knowledge. Their unique insights and 
capabilities are a valuable and untapped resource (e.g. junior doctors have better contemporary 
knowledge of innovative health care technologies and support tools) (Agents for Change, 2011; 
Brown et al., 2012; Swanwick, 2012). Hence, the researcher hypothesizes that teaching hospital 
help improve a hospital’s safety.  
Clinical care in teaching hospitals is more expensive which garners more scrutiny. 
Although they serve vital roles in education, research and management of complex diseases and 
care of vulnerable population, debate continues as to whether teaching hospital deliver better 
outcomes for common conditions (Shahian, Liu, Meyer, Torchiana, & Normand, 2014). Shahian 
2014 study, aimed to determine the association between risk mortality and teaching intensity for 
3 common conditions. The result of study determined that teaching hospitals had very favorable 
performance in quality (Shahian, Liu, Meyer, Torchiana, & Normand, 2014). As previously 
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argued teaching hospitals are better equipped financially, technologically, and academically to 
provide clinical care. Hence, it was deemed by the researcher an important variable to assess the 
association with teaching intensity, as incentive reward depends on clinical care outcomes. 
Delivering patient-centered care is an important component of a high-quality health care 
system (Tsai, Orav, & Jha, 2015). Teaching intensity is assumed to have a positive effect on 
patient experience because of a variety of factors such as the initial interaction with interns, 
accessibility to quality care (up to date to technology and best practices etc.) and diversification 
of staff knowledge (residents).  
Hospital Size  
The organizational behavior literature has consistently identified size as the most 
important organizational characteristic predicting innovation adoption among organizations. For 
instance, Damanpour [16], following a study of 57 libraries, observed that larger facilities 
adopted more technology than smaller facilities. This is because larger organizations tend to have 
more financial resources that they can devote to implementing new technologies. Lacking such 
resources, smaller organizations are forced to make difficult tradeoffs in their investment choices 
and often forgo implementation of expensive technologies. A similar logic can be extended in 
the context healthcare in that larger hospitals, by virtue of their larger resource endowments, can 
adopt more health care information technology than smaller hospitals (Hikmet et. al., 2007).  
Smaller hospitals often lack the technology, staffing, infrastructure, and resources 
necessary to implement patient safety practices (Klingner, Moscovice, Tupper, & Coburn, 2009). 
The higher the volume of hospital occupancy the more learning occurs, and the better the 
performance (Theokary & Ren, 2011). Thus, hospital size plays an important role in determining 
patient safety.  
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Hospitals complement and amplify the effectiveness of many other parts of the health system, 
providing continuous availability of services for acute and complex conditions (World Health 
Organization - Hospitals, 2020). However, there is the belief that larger hospitals lead to lower 
average costs and better clinical outcomes through the exploitation of economies of scale 
(Giancotti, Guglielmo, & Mauro, 2017). Hospital functions vary according to health-care 
delivery organizations and each hospital’s unique position in the system (World Health 
Organization - Hospitals, 2020). In many countries, the hospital sector has been involved in a 
massive reform process marked by financial restructuring of existing hospitals, mergers and 
closures of several small hospitals (Giancotti, Guglielmo, & Mauro, 2017). Hence, they need to 
maintain oversight of all ongoing health and health system reforms and ensure policies and 
incentives are coherent and aligned (World Health Organization - Hospitals, 2020). In addition, 
the logic behind hospital size and customer fulfillment is that larger hospital due to the 
availability of more resources have the structural and organizational processes in place to 
contribute to exceptional patient experience. For instance, technology adoption facilitates care 
models that improves patient experience. Hospitals and clinics nationwide are adding 
newfangled technologies rarely seen before in healthcare settings, building them right into their 
facilities. In doing so, they are enabling the change from provider-centered to patient-centered 
care, giving patients not only a better experience but better outcomes, too (Arndt, 2017).  
Case Mix Index  
  In an effort to refine the present Medicare reimbursement methodology and to reduce 
health care costs, the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) of the federal government's 
Department of Health and Human Services has developed a reimbursement ceiling that includes 
an adjustment factor for hospital case mix. "Case mix is a way of defining a hospital's 'product' 
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or output by identifying clinically homogeneous groups of patients that utilize similar bundles' of 
treatments, tests, and services. Case mix is a practice of coding that is administratively useful for 
partitioning patient services and determining resource allocation." The reason for using a case 
factor is to link the medical complexity of a hospital's Medicare case mix and its resultant 
demand hospital resources to the level of Medicare reimbursement (Doremus and Michenzi, 
1983). Overall, a higher CMI indicates that a hospital treats a more complex set of patients.  
Insurers such as Medicare use DRGs (Diagnosis Related Group) to reimburse hospitals and 
higher DRGs correspond to higher reimbursement rate (Ganju, Gupta, & Matreja, 2016) 
The logic dictates that a hospital performing more complex cases should receive a higher 
reimbursement rate than a hospital doing fewer complex cases. This is the reason CFOs and 
other financial employees at hospitals work hard to drive up their hospital’s CMI.  As such, it is 
important to document exactly what happens in each case accurately. One critical component of 
documentation in a hospital’s surgical areas is the detail surrounding medical devices used in 
each case.  If medical devices used in procedures are undocumented, this can result in inaccurate 
reporting of CMI and adversely impact reimbursement rate down the line (Why Case Mix Index 
Matters To Your Hospital And How To Maximize It, 2017). Hospitals executing more difficult 
procedures tend to be larger in nature. A debate can be that case mix index positively impacts 
patient safety as per the previous statement regarding procedure execution. Larger hospitals more 
resources- and so their survival rate will be higher. 
In Deloitte's 2016 report the value of patient experience: Hospitals with better patient-
reported experience perform better financially, we found that higher patient experience scores 
are associated with higher hospital profitability and that this association is strongest for aspects 
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of patient experience most likely to be associated with better clinical care (in particular, nurse 
staffing engagement), (Betts & Balan-Cohen, 2016).  
II.10 Hypotheses 
Model 1 – Safety 
H1- Teaching intensity influences Safety  
H2- Hospital Size influences Safety  
H3- Case Mix Index Influences Safety 
Model 2 – Clinical Care 
H4- Teaching Intensity influences Clinical Care 
H5- Hospital Size influences Clinical Care  
H6- Case Mix Index influences Clinical Care 
Model 3 – Patient Experience 
H7- Teaching Intensity influences Patient Experience 
H8- Hospital Size influences Patient Experience 
H9- Case Mix Index Influences Patient Experience 
Model 4 – Efficiency and Cost 
H10- Teaching Intensity influences Efficiency and Cost 
H11- hospital size influences Efficiency and Cost  
H12- Case Mix Index Influences Efficiency and Cost 
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III CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
III.1 Research Design 
 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is the U.S. federal agency that 
works with state governments to manage the Medicare program, and administer Medicaid and 
the Children’s Health Insurance program. CMS offers many great resources for researchers who 
are looking for health data. For example: 
• CMS Statistics is a yearly reference booklet that people can download on the CMS website. 
It has summary information about health care expenses and use. 
• The Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement has detailed statistics on Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other CMS programs. It has 115 tables and 67 charts that detail health 
expenditures for the entire U.S. population.  
• Hospital Compare is an online tool created by CMS that helps users find information about 
the quality of care at over 4,000 Medicare-certified hospitals across the United States. 
• The CMS Data Navigator lets users search across all CMS programs using a menu-driven 
search application. Users can specify a particular type of data, or search for all available data 
types (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2020). 
CMS requires Medicare managed care program providers to retain records for 10 years. This 
requirement is available at 42 CFR 422.504 on the Internet. Providers/suppliers should maintain 
a medical record for each Medicare beneficiary that is their patient. Remember that medical 
records must be accurately written, promptly completed, accessible, properly filed and retained. 
Using a system of author identification and record maintenance that ensures the integrity of the 
authentication and protects the security of all record entries is a good practice (Medical Record 
Retention and Media Formats for Medical Records , 2012). To address the research question: 
“What factors affect hospital performance? The study explores the data behind CMS ratings to 
examine the significance of VPB. The research design summary is explained in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Research design Summary (adapted from Mathiassen, 2017) 
 
III.2 Dependent variables  
Safety (Healthcare Associated Infections). To be incentivized by Center of Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, all hospitals participating in the Value based Purchasing program 
have to report all data surrounding patients with infections to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). This 
Component Definition  
 
Specification  
 
 
Title 
 
The title expresses the essence of the 
research design, with emphasis on C 
An Exploratory Study of The Factors 
Affecting Hospital Performance: Safety, 
Clinical Care, Patient Experience, Efficiency 
and Cost 
 
 
P  
 
The problem setting represents 
people’s concerns in a real-world 
problematic situation.  
 
The quality of healthcare has declined while 
cost have risen. 
 
A  
 
The area of concern represents 
somebody of knowledge in the 
literature that relates to P.  
 
Healthcare reform and the outcomes, 
structure, and process of Medicare’s value 
base purchasing program 
 
F  
 
The conceptual framing helps 
structure collection and analyses of 
data from P to answer RQ; FA draws 
on concepts from A, whereas FI 
draws on concepts independent of A.  
 
Donabedian model of quality and care 
 
M  
 
The method details the approach to 
empirical inquiry, specifically to data 
collection and analysis.  
 
Exploration of Secondary data from CMS 
 
RQ  
 
The research question relates to P, 
opens for research into A, and helps 
ensure the research design is coherent 
and consistent.  
 
What factors affect hospital performance? 
 
 
C  
 
Contributions influence P and A, and 
possibly also F and M.  
 
Prescriptive guide for policy makers, hospital 
administrators, medical, business 
professionals and researchers. 
Add to the body of knowledge in healthcare 
reform and VBP. 
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measure provides essential data to display the number of times a patient from a particular 
hospital contracts an infection during the course of their medical treatment when 
compared to like hospitals. “The safety domain is comprised of six healthcare associated 
infections (HAI) measures and one perinatal care measure that are weighted together at a 
twenty percent of the total performance score. 
Clinical Care (Mortality). This measure are estimates of deaths within a 30-day period 
of hospital admissions in regard to medical conditions such as, heart attack (AMI), heart 
failure (HF), pneumonia (PN), Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), stroke, 
and surgical procedures such as coronary artery bypass graft (CABG). A 30-day window 
is used for this measure compared to the number of inpatient deaths to allow for a more 
reliable measure as hospital stays may vary across patients and hospital. “The clinical 
care domain comprises of three mortality measures and one surgical complication 
measure that are weighted together at twenty five percent of the total performance score. 
Patient Experience (Person and community engagement). This means of data 
collection methodology is used to measure patients’ perception of their hospital 
experience. To aid with the measure data is collected from providing to patients the 
HCAHPS patient survey also called the CAHPA hospital survey or Hospital CAHPS. 
The survey is given to random patients upon discharge. The survey asks key questions in 
regard to communication with hospital staff, responsiveness of hospital staff, cleanliness 
of hospital environment and quietness of hospital environment and transition of care. 
“The patient experience domain is comprised of eight dimensions of hospital consumer 
assessment of healthcare providers and systems (HCAHPS) patient experience survey 
that are weighted together at twenty of the total performance score.” 
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Efficiency & Cost. Efficiency and cost reduction domain comprise of one Medicare 
spending measure (Medicare spending per Beneficiary-MSPB) that is weighted at twenty 
five percent of the total performance score. 
 
Figure 3: Understanding the Value Based Purchasing Measures 
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Table 3: Measures 
 
 
III.3 Independent Variables 
Teaching Intensity. looked at the role junior doctors played in administering health care 
to patients. The study assessed the ratio between the number of interns/residents to the 
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number of beds in a hospital, as Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
identifies teaching hospitals by an intern-to-bed ratio greater than 0.  
Hospital Size. is based on the number of beds; specifically, hospitals were classified as 
small (less than 100 beds), medium (100–399 beds) or large (400+beds) (Gabriel et. Al). 
The hospital size is measured using the number of beds at the hospital (Sharma et al., 
2015).  
Case Mix Index. derived from the CMS impact file to measure the severity of illness of 
patients admitted to hospitals. Case mix index generally can be defined as the number 
and types of patients treated, classified by diagnoses. Diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) 
present a patient classification scheme that belongs to case mix measures originally 
developed in the United States in the 1970s. They are currently designed on the basis of 
principle diagnosis, secondary diagnosis, surgical or medical procedure, age, sex and 
discharge status of the patient treated (Hensen, Fürstenberg, Luger, & Steinhoff, 2005) 
Control Variable  
The researcher used geography and proprietary rights as control invariants at the hospital 
level, including location, ownership, and region. The regions included: Northeast, West, South, 
and Midwest. Hospital ownership types exist on a continuum that is more complex than simple 
private or public distinction. Hospital ownership ranges from public (government owned), to 
quasi-public (nonprofit), to private (for-profit hospitals) (Ibrahim, Jeffcott, & Davis, 2013). 
Healthcare is one of the few industries where public and private institutions compete with one 
another (Goldstein and Noar, 2005). For-profit (purely private) hospital ownership is usually 
defined as being owned by stockholders with profitability as the driving force with less political 
oversight than nonprofit and government hospitals. Conversely, government (purely public) 
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hospitals are regulated by a governmental body, driven by survival, and overseen by political 
regulations (Goldstein and Noar, 2005). Nonprofit (quasi-public) hospital ownership is defined 
as private hospitals that choose to follow governmental regulations by choice rather than 
requirement (Goldstein and Noar, 2005). There are practical differences in behavior between the 
two hospital types. Nonprofit hospitals are less concerned about market value information and 
place less emphasis on costs of healthcare inputs and odds of hospital bill payment by patients 
(Goldstein and Noar, 2005). Despite these practical differences, there has been growing concern 
that the level of community benefit that nonprofit hospitals provide justifies their tax exemptions 
are few differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals (Young et al., 2013). Nonprofit 
hospitals and private for-profit hospitals tend to have more autonomy in decision making than 
their government and nonprofit counterparts because the latter are dictated by strict government 
rules and regulations (Johansen and Zhu, 2013). However, some private hospitals self-select to 
follow all governmental regulations to ensure they have the safest environment possible 
(Goldstein and Noar, 2005). 
III.4 Data Collection, Cleaning and Preparation 
To test my hypotheses, we collected secondary data from 2, 786 U. S acute care hospitals 
who provide inpatient services to Medicare patients. Exclusively, secondary data was retrieved 
from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Hospital Compare Database and Provider 
of Services (POS) and impact files. The files included 2018 Hospital Value Based Purchasing 
(HVBP)- Total performance scores; and 2018 Final rule and correction notice data file.   
After lots of trial and error and assessing of variables, I decided to use the most recent data 
which is 2018. Additionally, 2018 was a good starting point for us, as the Center for Medicare 
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and Medicaid services improved their data collection delivery parameters, making data more 
succinct and user friendly. It was only logical to proceed with analyzing this available data. 
All data generated had at least two common identifiers, which were the provider 
identification number and measure identification or measure name.  This made it very 
unassuming to eyeball the data and pinpoint certain characteristics based on location.  From the 
2018 Hospital value base purchasing total performance score file, I elected to use the weighed 
scores for safety, clinical care, person and community engagement (patient experience) and 
efficiency and cost. From the 2018 Final rule and correction notice data file, I elected, the 
resident to bed ratio variable, CMIV35 (Case mix index, software version 35, most up to date 
software), bed variable, location, ownership and region variables. Vlookup on this data to select 
only hospitals who participate in the Medicare value-based purchasing program. 
For categorical variables, Region, location, and hospital ownership dummy variables 
(Tables 4-Table 6) were created. From the FY 2018 IPPS Impact file region was coded as 
follows: 1= New England; 2= Middle Atlantic; 3= South Atlantic; 4= East North; 5= East South 
Central; 6= West North Central; 7= West South Central; 8= Mountain; 9= Pacific; 40= Puerto 
Rico. I performed an IF function in excel and a grouping exercise to align the data provided for 
Region with the US Census Regions and Divisions map, please see Figure (4) below. To 
validate my data, I created filters in excel for all variables to make sure all data was group 
correctly. 
All variables were separated into their own files. All files were imported and saved in 
SPSS format. These data files were then merged for analysis in SPSS. In this study we apply 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis to explore the factors that affect hospital 
performance. 
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Figure 4: Census Regions and Divisions of the U.S. 
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Schemers 
Table 4: Dummy Variables 
REGION  
 
     
 D- Region 1 
NE 
D- Region 2 
South 
D- Region 3 
Midwest 
D-Region 4 
West 
  
Puerto Rico  
     0 
 
     0 
 
      0 
 
     0 
Base 
Case 
 
Northeast      1      0       0      0   
South      0      1       0      0   
Midwest      0      0       1      0   
West      0      0       0      1   
 
Table 5: Dummy Variables 
 
LOCATION 
 
   
 D-Urban D-Rural  
Urban             0             0 Base Case 
Rural             0             1  
 
 
Table 6: Dummy Variables 
 
HOSPITAL OWNERSHIP 
 
    
     D-HO 1      D-HO 2  
Government          0           0 Base Case 
Private          1           0  
Nonprofit          0           1  
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III.5 Research Models 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Model 2 
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Figure 7: Model 3 
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IV CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The goal of this study was to investigate the historical context of Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing. The study hypothesized that hospital safety, clinical care, patient experience, and 
efficiency and cost (dependent variables) are individually influenced by several stand-alone 
factors (independent variables), as well as these same factors combined. These factors include, 
teaching intensity, hospital size and case mix index. The following sections provided descriptive 
statistics for all variables, bivariate regression results demonstrating the predictive nature of each 
independent variable for each dependent variable, and multiple linear regression and multiple 
hierarchical regression results, demonstrating the combined predictive nature of each 
independent variable for each dependent variable. Region, location, and hospital ownership were 
assessed for their relationship to dependent variables (bivariate regression). This was done by 
regressing each dependent variable on Region, location, and hospital ownership combined.  
Significant results are reported at p ≤ 0.05. For the bivariate regressions, false-discovery 
rate (FDR) was applied to account for multiple comparisons of the dependent variable across 
several bivariate regressions. Correction was applied for bivariate regression results for 
dependent variables and control variables, with a separate correction applied to the bivariate 
regression results for dependent variables and independent variables.  FDR-corrections are 
designed to control the proportion of "discoveries" (rejected null hypotheses) that are false (Type 
I error) (Benjamin & Hochberg, 1995) Each multiple linear regression model was treated as an 
independent model; therefore, no FDR correction was applied.  
IV.1 Univariate Analysis  
Table 4 exhibits and summarizes descriptive statistics on the dependent variables used in 
this study. The dataset for all dependent variables except clinical care are slightly skewed to the 
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right, being that the arithmetic mean of all these three datasets are greater than the median. 
Dependent variable, clinical care, has an approximate symmetric distribution since the measures 
of central tendency (mean and median) are relatively close. 
Portrayed in Table 5, The datasets for all independent variables except case mix index are 
positively skewed (right tail, is longer and flatter). The data for independent variable, case mix 
index, has an approximate symmetric distribution since it is measure of central tendency are 
comparatively close. Please see histograms in figures 9-15 as a guide for the distributions. 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous DVs (DV1, DV2, DV3, and DV4)  
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous IVs (IV1, IV2 and IV3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Histogram - Safety 
 
DV1: Safety 
The Safety domain is the dependent variable which comprises of two measure scores 
(Healthcare associated infections and PC-01/ Percent of mothers whose deliveries were 
scheduled too early (1-2 weeks early), when a scheduled delivery was not medically necessary), 
(Safety domain scores, 2020). The sample size for this domain was N= 2,786 of which 2,572 
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were valid in this study. The average value of safety scores reported to the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid services were 11.065 with a standard deviation of 5.625 (M= 11.065, SD= 5.625); 
minimum .000, maximum 3.333. The skewness calculated was 0.574 meaning that our data is 
moderately skewed to the right since our distribution is between 0.5 and 1. This construct is 
positively kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 0.419 and close to zero, so, therefore, this is a normal 
distribution. Alternatively, the kurtosis was divided by its standard error (0.419/0.097) = 4.319; 
since the result is greater than 1.96 this also proves that the distribution is indeed a normal 
distribution. 
  
 
 
Figure 10: Histogram – Clinical Care 
 
 
DV2: Clinical Care 
The Clinical Care domain is the dependent variable which comprises of four mortality 
measures (domain measures assess estimates of deaths in the 30 days after entering the hospital 
for a specific condition (reported as the “survival” rate; therefore, higher percentage rates are 
favorable), (Clinical Outcomes domain, 2020).The sample size for this domain was N= 2,786 of 
which 2,709 were valid in this study. The average value of clinical care scores reported to the 
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Center for Medicare and Medicaid services were 13.850 with a standard deviation of 5.00 (M= 
13.850, SD= 5.00); minimum .000, maximum 3.33. The skewness calculated was -0.038 
meaning that our data is highly skewed to the left since our distribution is less than -1. The 
kurtosis statistic for clinical care is 0.06 (mesokurtic), therefore, this is a normal distribution is 
close to zero. Alternatively, the skew and kurtosis statistics for this construct are not greater than 
twice their standard error. Data distribution is depicted in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Histogram – Patient Experience 
 
DV3: Patient Experience 
The Patient Experience domain is the dependent variable which comprises of eight 
measure scores (standardize survey that ask patients about their experiences during recent 
hospital stay) (Person and community engagement domain, 2020). 
The sample size for this domain was N= 2,786 of which 2,776 were valid in this study. The 
average value of patient experience scores reported to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
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services were 9.11 with a standard deviation of 5.06 (M= 9.11, SD= 5.06); minimum .00, 
maximum 3.33. The skewness calculated was 1.51 meaning that our data is highly skewed to the 
right since our distribution is greater than 1. This construct is positively kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 
2.93 and has a normal distribution. This was determined by dividing the kurtosis by its standard 
error (2.93/0.09) = 32.56; A normal distribution is present since the kurtosis is less than 3. Data 
distribution is depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 12: Histogram – Efficiency and Cost 
 
DV4: Efficiency and Cost 
The efficiency and cost domain is the dependent variable whose measure is based on an 
assessment of payment for services provided to a beneficiary during a spend- per-beneficiary 
episode (Efficiency and cost reduction domain, 2020). 
The sample size for this domain was N= 2,786 of which 2,785 were valid in this study. The 
average value of efficiency and cost scores reported to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
services were 5.35 with a standard deviation of 7.12 (M= 5.35, SD= 7.12); minimum .00, 
maximum 3.33.  
 46 
The skewness calculated was 1.76 meaning that our data is highly skewed to the right 
since our distribution is greater than 1. This construct is positively kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 3.08 
and has somewhat of a flat normal distribution. Data distribution is depicted in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 13: Histogram – Teaching Intensity 
 
IV1: Teaching Intensity 
The sample size for the teaching intensity construct was N= 2,786 of which 2,785 were 
valid in this study. The average value of teaching intensity scores reported to the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid services were 0.01 with a standard deviation of 0.08 (M= 0.01, SD= 
0.08); minimum .00, maximum 1.30. The skewness calculated was 9.40 meaning that our data is 
highly skewed to the right since our distribution is greater than 1. This construct is positively 
kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 106.27 which is high and significant.  Alternatively, the kurtosis was 
divided by its standard error (106.27/.09) = 1,180.78. There is a statistically significant amount 
of skew associated with this distribution because the Z value is greater than the absolute value of 
1.96. In conclusion the distribution is not normal. Data distribution is depicted in Figure 13. 
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Figure 14: Histogram – Hospital Size 
 
IV2: Hospital Size 
The sample size for the teaching intensity construct was N= 2,786 of which all cases were 
valid in this study. The average value of the number of beds reported to the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid services was 269 with a standard deviation of 241.66 (M= 269, SD= 241.66); 
minimum 10, maximum 2,449. The skewness calculated was 2.65 meaning that our data is 
positively skewed to the right since our distribution is greater than 1. This construct is positively 
kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 12.01, which is high and significant. With a kurtosis on more than 3 it 
can conclude that our dataset tails are heavier than that of a normal distribution. 
Alternatively, the kurtosis was divided by its standard error (12.01/.09) = 133.44. There 
is a statistically significant amount of skew associated with this distribution because the Z value 
is greater than the absolute value of 1.96. Therefore, it can be concluded that this distribution is 
not normal. Data distribution is depicted in Figure 14. 
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Figure 15: Histogram – Case Mix Index 
 
IV3: Case Mix Index 
 
The sample size for the teaching intensity construct was N= 2,786 of which 2,779 were 
valid in this study. The average value of case mix index scores reported to the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid services were 1.61 with a standard deviation of 0.29 (M= 1.61, SD= 
0.29); minimum 0.89, maximum 3.53. The skewness calculated was 0.75 moderately skewed to 
the right since our distribution is between 0.5 and 1. This construct is positively kurtosed 
(leptokurtosed) 2.07. Since the kurtosis is less than 3, in conclusion this distribution is normal. 
Data distribution is depicted in Figure 15. 
 
Bivariate Analyses  
Below, figure 16, 17, 18, and 19 shows the models that discuss the relationship between 
variables assessed with Bivariate analyses and Tables 9-12 exhibits the results of this study. 
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Figure 16: Bivariate Model DV1 & DV2 
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Figure 17: Bivariate Model DV3 & DV4 
 
Table 9- Bivariate Simple Regression with DV1 and IV1-IV3 
Simple 
Regression # 
Independent 
Variable 
 
R2 (%) 
 
PVAL 
 
β 
 
F 
1 Teaching 
Intensity 
 
0.40 
 
0.001 
 
-.063 
 
10.239 
2 Hospital Size 8.7 0.000 -.295 244.724 
3 Case Mix Index 9.3 0.000 -.304 261.836 
 
 
Table 10- Bivariate Simple Regression with DV2 and IV1-IV3 
Simple 
Regression # 
Independent 
Variable 
 
R2 (%) 
 
PVAL 
 
β 
 
F 
1 Teaching 
Intensity 
 
0.20 
 
0.020 
 
0.045 
 
5.430 
2 Hospital Size 3.20 0.000 0.179 89.197 
3 Case Mix Index 5.40 0.000 0.232 153.169 
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Table 11- Bivariate Simple Regression with DV3 and IV1-IV3 
 
Simple 
Regression # 
Independent 
Variable 
 
R2 (%) 
 
PVAL 
 
β 
 
F 
1 Teaching 
Intensity 
 
3.00 
 
0.006 
 
-0.520 
 
7.619 
2 Hospital Size 8.60 0.000 -0.294 262.033 
3 Case Mix Index 2.30 0.000 -0.152 65.521 
 
 
Table 12- Bivariate Simple Regression with DV4 and IV1-IV3 
 
Simple 
Regression # 
Independent 
Variable 
 
R2 (%) 
 
PVAL 
 
β 
 
F 
1 Teaching 
Intensity 
 
- 
 
0.416 
 
-0.015 
 
0.661 
2 Hospital Size 8.10 0.000 -0.284 245.024 
3 Case Mix Index 6.40 0.000 -0.253 189.641 
 
 
Table 13 All hypothesized relations at Alpha 5% 
 
HYPOTHESIS SUPPORT (*p ≤ .05) 
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Effect of Teaching Intensity on Safety 
 
H1 suggest that there is a negative correlation between teaching intensity and safety (β= -
.063, P=.001, F =10.239). Simple regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. The 
amount of variance in safety scores that are accounted for or explained by teaching intensity is 
.4% (R2 = 0.004) (Table 9) 
Effect of Hospital Size on Safety 
 
H2 suggest that there is a strong negative correlation between hospital size and safety (β= 
-.295, P=.000, F =244.724). Simple regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. The 
amount of variance in safety scores that are accounted for or explained by hospital size is 8.7 % 
(R2 = 0.087) (Table 9).  
Effect of Case Mix Index on Safety 
H3 suggest that there is a statistically strong negative correlation between case mix index 
and safety (β= -.304, P=.000, F =261.836). Simple regression analysis was used to test this 
hypothesis. The amount of variance in safety scores that are accounted for or explained by the 
case mix index is 9.3% (R2 = 0.093) (Table 9).  
Effect of Teaching Intensity on Clinical Care 
H4 suggest that a positive correlation exist between teaching intensity and clinical care 
(β= .045, P=.020, F = 5.430). Simple regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. The 
amount of variance in clinical care scores that are accounted for or explained by teaching 
intensity is .2% (R2 = .002) (Table 10). 
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Effect of Hospital Size on Clinical Care 
H5 suggest that a statistically notable correlation exist between hospital size and clinical 
care (β= .179, P=.000, F = 89.197). Simple regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. 
The amount of variance in clinical care scores that are accounted for or explained by hospital 
size is 3.2% (R2 = .032) (Table 10).  
Effect of Case Mix Index on Clinical Care 
H6 suggest that a statistically essential correlation exist between case mix index and 
clinical care (β= .232, P=.000, F = 153.169). Simple regression analysis was used to test this 
hypothesis. The amount of variance in clinical care scores that are accounted for or explained by 
case mix index is 5.4 % (R2 = .054) (Table 10).  
 
Effect of Teaching Intensity on Patient Experience 
H7 suggest that a statistically negative correlation exist between teaching intensity and 
patient experience (β= -.52, P=.006, F = 7.619). Simple regression analysis was used to test this 
hypothesis.  The amount of variance in patient experience scores that are accounted for or 
explained by teaching intensity is 3 % (R2 = .003) (Table 11).  
Effect of Hospital Size on Patient Experience 
H8 suggest that a strong negative correlation exist between hospital size and patient 
experience (β= -.294, P=.000, F = 262.033). Simple regression analysis was used to test this 
hypothesis. The amount of variance in patient experience sores that are accounted for or 
explained by hospital size is 8.6 % (R2 = .086) (Table 11).  
Effect of Case Mix Index on Patient Experience 
 
H9 suggest that a statistically negative correlation exist between case mix index and 
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patient experience (β= -.152, P=.000, F = 65.521). Simple regression analysis was used to test 
this hypothesis.  The amount of variance in patient experience sores that are accounted for or 
explained by case mix index is 2.3 % (R2 = .023) (Table 11).  
Effect of Teaching Intensity on Efficiency and Cost 
 
H10 suggest that a robust negative correlation exist between teaching intensity and 
efficiency and cost (β= -.015, P=.416, F = .661). Simple regression analysis was used to test this 
hypothesis. The amount of variance in efficiency and cost scores that are accounted for or 
explained by teaching intensity is 0 % (R2 = .000) (Table 12).  
Effect of Hospital Size on Efficiency and Cost 
 
H11 suggest that a significant negative correlation exist between hospital size and 
efficiency and cost (β= -.284, P=.000, F = 245.024). Simple regression analysis was used to test 
this hypothesis. The amount of variance in efficiency and cost scores that are accounted for or 
explained by hospital size is 8.1% (R2 = .081) (Table 12).  
Effect of Case Mix Index on Efficiency and Cost 
 
H12 suggest that a significant negative correlation exist between case mix index and 
efficiency and cost (β= -.253, P=.000, F = 189.641). Simple regression analysis was used to test 
this hypothesis.  The amount of variance in efficiency and cost scores that are accounted for or 
explained by case mix index is 6.4% (R2 = .064) (Table 12).  
Bivariate Results 
Bivariate regression results indicate that teaching intensity, hospital size and CMI are 
significant predictors of safety, clinical care, patient experience and efficiency and cost. More 
intense teaching, larger hospitals and higher CMI all negatively predict lower safety scores. The 
same is true for patient experience. Conversely, an increase on these variables predicts a higher 
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level of clinical care. Efficiency and cost results present a mixed narrative, with teaching 
intensity not associated with efficiency and cost, and larger hospitals and higher case index 
predicting lower efficiency and cost.  
IV.2 Multivariate Analyses  
 
Figure 18: Multivariate model, all IVS on DV1 & all IVS on DV2 
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Figure 19: Multivariate model, all IVS on DV3 & all IVS on DV4 
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Figure 20: Hierarchical Multiple Regression, Safety and Clinical Care 
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Figure 21: Hierarchical Multiple Regression, Patient experience and Efficiency and Cost 
 
Diagnostic, Multiple Regression Model 
Illustrated in Table 15 is the multicollinearity among independent variables and 
dependent variables. The variance inflation factor assessed whether variables have a strong linear 
relationship. If VIF > 2.5, then it indicates strong collinearity among variables. This diagnostic 
was run to ensure that there was not a high degree of multicollinearity in the regressions. A high 
degree of multicollinearity causes and unstable regression and also inflates the standard error. 
The variables used in this study all exhibits a VIF below 2.5. There are no interrelating 
characteristics among variables. As part of the assumptions testing for a multiple linear 
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regression, the dataset was used to test for multicollinearity. The data included 2,786 US acute 
care scores submitted to Medicare. The proposed multiple line regression would test hypotheses. 
Table 14: Multicollinearity on IVs and DVs 
 
    
 
Variable Teaching 
Intensity (VIF) 
Hospital Size 
(VIF) 
Case Mix Index 
(VIF) 
 
Safety 
 
1.038 
 
1.396 
 
1.418 
Clinical Care 1.034 1.436 1.448 
Patient Experience 1.037 1.400 1.417 
Efficiency & Cost 0.097 1.401 1.418 
VIF > 2.5 
 
The tolerance statistic among variables (VIF = 1.038 for safety and teaching intensity; 
1.40 for Patient experience and hospital size; 1.448 for Clinical care and case mix and 0.097 for 
Efficiency and Cost and Teaching intensity) signifies that a very low level of multicollinearity 
was present, all results generated below the VIF threshold of 2.5 therefore no collinearity was 
found between variables and as a result no variables will be removed from our model. 
 
Multivariate Results 
 
Multiple linear regression results between dependent variables (Safety, Clinical Care, 
Patient Experience and Efficiency and Cost) and independent variables (Teaching Intensity, 
Hospital Size and Case Mix Index). Model fit is indicated under the r2 column. Coefficients for 
each independent variable are list per model. 
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Table 15: Multiple Linear Regression on DVs and IVs 
 
    
 
Dependable 
Variable 
 
R2  
 
Teaching Intensity 
(β) 
 
Hospital Size (β) 
 
Case Mix Index 
(β) 
 
Safety 
 
 
0.118 
 
 
0.001* 
 
 
-0.187* 
 
 
-0.206* 
Clinical Care 
 
 
0.057 
 
 
0.001* 
 
 
0.074* 
 
 
0.191* 
 
Patient Experience 
 
 
0.086 
 
 
-0.011* 
 
 
-0.295* 
 
 
0.007* 
 
 
Efficiency & Cost 
 
 
0.097 
 
 
0.042* 
 
 
-0.213* 
 
 
-0.147* 
 
 
*significant at p ≤ 0.05 
For Safety scores, only hospital size and CMI remain significant when all independent 
variables are included in the same model. An increase in hospital size predicts a decrease in 
safety scores. For Clinical care, teaching intensity is also a non-significant predictor. Meanwhile, 
larger hospitals and higher CMI both predict a higher level of clinical care. For patient 
experience, teaching intensity is also non-significant and so is CMI. Only hospital size is 
predictive of patient experience, with larger hospitals indicating a lower score on patient 
experience. Efficiency and cost are the only multivariate model in which all predictors are 
significant. A higher level of teaching intensity is predictive of a higher level of efficiency and 
cost. Conversely, a larger hospital and higher CMI are predictive of lower efficiency and cost 
(Please see Appendix 3) 
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Table 16: Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Safety 
 
* statistically significant at 5% level  
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Table 17: Hierarchical Regression DV 1 (Safety) 
                                                      
                                       Model 0                      Model 1 
 
(Constant) 12.58  19.711 
    
Region    
DRegion1NE -0.15  -0.38 
DRegion2S 0.113  0.149 
DRegion3MW 0.344  0.171 
DRegion4W 0.773  1.199 
 
Location    
Rural 1/Urban 0 -2.158  -0.733 
 
Ownership    
DPrivate 0.442  0.144 
DNonProfit -0.147  0.057 
    
Teaching Intensity   0.051 
Case Mix Index   -4.339 
Hospital Size   -0.004 
 
R2 0.033  0.129 
∆R2 -  0.096 
F 12.413  37.439 
∆F -  25.026 
        
                                    
 
Where: 
 
∆F =  (R22   -  R
2
1 ) / (k2  - k1 )  
  ___________________ 
 
   (1-R22) / (N – k2 – 1) 
 
 
F is statistically significant at 1% level (Appendix 3, table 78, F distribution critical values) 
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R21  is the value of R
2   for the first (smaller) model, R22  is the value of R
2 for the second (larger) 
model, k1  is the number of independent variables in the first model and k2  is the number of 
independent variables in the second model (Miles & Shelvin, 2001, p. 37). 
 
Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Safety 
 
All Independent variables were entered manually in the following order (Control 
Variables), Region (DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DRegion2MW, DRegion4W), Location (Rural) 
and Hospital Ownership (DPrivate and DNonProfit). The hierarchical multiple regression in 
model 0, displayed, Region, Location and Hospital ownership contributed considerably to the 
regression model, F (7, 2529) = 12.413, * p = .000) and accounted for 3.3% of the variation in 
Safety (Appendix MHR Table 1-2). Introducing the independent variables in model 1 (Teaching 
intensity, Case Mix Index and Hospital size) explained an additional 12.9% of variation in Safety 
and this change in R2 was significant F (10,2526) = 37.44, *p = .000.  
The statistically significant variables were Region- West, Location, Case Mix Index and 
Hospital size. With case mix index generating the most intense beta value (β = –.210, B = -4.339, 
*p = .000). Hospital size exhibited the second strongest beta (β =-.167, B = -.004, *p = .000); 
Location results (β = -.057, B = -733, * p = .005); Region (West) results (β = .055, B = 1.199, * p 
= .014).  
The variables that were not statistically significant and which were not good predictors of 
safety were Teaching intensity (β = .001, B = .051, p = .969); Hospital ownership- DNonProfit 
(β = .005, B = .057, p = .856); Hospital Ownership- DPrivate (β = .010, B = .144, p = .702); 
Midwest Region- DRegion3MW results (β = .013, B = .171, p = .640); South Region- 
DRegion2S (β = .011, B = .149, p = .696) and North East Region- DRegion1NE (β = -.032, B = -
.380, p = .271), (From appendix MHR- Table 6). 
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Table 18: Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Clinical Care 
Variable β 
DRegion1NE β = -.017 
DRegion2S β = -.136* 
DRegion3MW β = -.027 
DRegion4W β = -.043* 
Location β = .093* 
DPrivate β = .117* 
DNonProfit β = .135* 
Teaching Intensity β = 007 
Case Mix Index β = .134* 
HospitalSize β = .075* 
 
Final Model (1) 
 
R2 = 9.6% 
 
 
 
 
* statistically significant at 5% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
Table 19: Hierarchical Regression DV 2 (Clinical Care) 
 
                                                      
                                       Model 0                      Model 1 
 
(Constant) 13.708  9.337 
    
Region    
DRegion1NE -0.367  -0.175 
DRegion2S -1.765  -1.634 
DRegion3MW -0.44  -0.31 
DRegion4W -0.653  -0.851 
 
Location    
Rural 1/Urban 0 -1.784  -1.036 
 
Ownership    
DPrivate 1.399  1.468 
DNonProfit 1.568  1.418 
    
Teaching 
Intensity   0.481 
Case Mix Index   2.311 
HospitalSize   0.002 
 
R2 0.066  0.096 
∆R2 -  0.03 
F 26.828  28.137 
∆F -  1.309 
        
                                        
 
Where: 
 
∆F =  (R22   -  R
2
1 ) / (k2  - k1 )  
  ___________________ 
 
   (1-R22) / (N – k2 – 1) 
 
 
F is statistically significant at 1% level (Appendix 3, table 78, F distribution critical values) 
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R21  is the value of R
2   for the first (smaller) model, R22  is the value of R
2 for the second (larger) 
model, k1  is the number of independent variables in the first model and k2  is the number of 
independent variables in the second model (Miles & Shelvin, 2001, p. 37). 
 
Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Clinical Care 
 
All Independent variables were entered manually in the following order (Control 
Variables), Region (DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DRegion2MW, DRegion4W), Location (Rural) 
and Hospital Ownership (DPrivate and DNonProfit). The hierarchical multiple regression in 
model 0, displayed, Region, Location and Hospital ownership contributed significantly to the 
regression model, F (7, 2660) = 26.83, * p = .000) and accounted for 6.6% of the variation in 
Clinical Care (appendix MHR- Table 7). Introducing the independent variables in model 1 
(Teaching intensity, Case Mix Index and Hospital size) explained an additional 9.6% of variation 
in Clinical Care and this change in R2 was significant F (10, 2657) = 28.14, *p = .000.  
The statistically significant variables were Region- South, Region- West, Location, 
Hospital ownership (DPrivate, DNonProfit); Case Mix Index and Hospital size. With Region-
South generating the most intense beta value (β = –.136, B = -1.634, *p = .000). Region- West 
exhibited the second strongest beta (β = -.043, B = -.851, *p = .055); Location results (β = .93, B 
= 1.036, * p = .000); Hospital Ownership (DPrivate) results (β = .117, B = 1.468, * p = .000); 
Hospital Ownership (DNonProfit) results (β = .135, B = 1.418, * p = .000); Case Mix Index 
results (β = .134, B = 2.311, * p = .000); Hospital Size (β = .075, B = .002, * p = .001). 
 
The variables that were not statistically significant and which were not good predictors of 
Clinical Care were Region- North East (β = -.017, B = .175, p = .582); Region- Midwest (β = -
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.027, B = -.310, p = .354); Teaching Intensity (β = .007, B = .481, p = .707 (appendix MHR- 
Table 12). 
 
Table 20: Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Patient Experience 
 
Variable β 
DRegion1NE β = -.017 
DRegion2S β = -.136* 
DRegion3MW β = -.027 
DRegion4W β = -.043* 
Location β = .093* 
DPrivate β = .117* 
DNonProfit β = .135* 
Teaching Intensity β = 007 
Case Mix Index β = .134* 
HospitalSize β = .075* 
 
Final Model (1) 
 
R2 = 9.6% 
 
 
 
 
* statistically significant at 5% level 
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Table 21: Hierarchical Regression DV 3 (Patient Experience) 
 
                                                      
                                       Model 0                      Model 1 
 
(Constant) 7.34  6.69 
    
Region    
DRegion1NE 0.771  -1.33 
DRegion2S 3.186  3.707 
DRegion3MW 2.27  2.631 
DRegion4W 0.711  0641 
 
Location    
Rural 1/Urban 
0 1.626  0.988 
 
Ownership    
DPrivate -1.035  -1.455 
DNonProfit -0.086  -0.086 
    
Teaching 
Intensity   1.192 
Case Mix 
Index   1.45 
HospitalSize   -0.007 
 
R2 0.088  0.166 
∆R2 -  0.078 
F 37.768  54.187 
∆F -  16.419 
        
                                        
 
Where: 
 
∆F =  (R22   -  R
2
1 ) / (k2  - k1 )  
  ___________________ 
 
   (1-R22) / (N – k2 – 1) 
 
 
F is statistically significant at 1% level (Appendix 3, table 78, F distribution critical values) 
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R21  is the value of R
2   for the first (smaller) model, R22  is the value of R
2 for the second (larger) 
model, k1  is the number of independent variables in the first model and k2  is the number of 
independent variables in the second model (Miles & Shelvin, 2001, p. 37). 
 
Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Patient Experience 
 
All Independent variables were entered manually in the following order (Control 
Variables), Region (DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DRegion2MW, DRegion4W), Location (Rural) 
and Hospital Ownership (DPrivate and DNonProfit). The hierarchical multiple regression in 
model 0, displayed, Region, Location and Hospital ownership contributed significantly to the 
regression model, F (7, 2723) = 37.77, * p = .000) and accounted for 8.8% of the variation in 
Patient Experience (appendix MHR- Table 13, Table 14). Introducing the independent variables 
in model 1 (Teaching intensity, Case Mix Index and Hospital size) explained an additional 
16.6% of variation in Patient Experience and this change in R2 was significant F (10, 2720) = 
54.19, *p = .000.  
The statistically significant variables were Region- North East, South, Midwest, 
Location, Hospital ownership (DPrivate); Case Mix Index and Hospital size. With hospital size 
generating the most intense beta value (β = –.326, B = -.007, *p = .000). Hospital ownership 
(DPrivate) with the second strongest beta (β = -.115, B = -1.455, *p = .000); Location results (β 
= .088, B = .988, * p = .000); Case Mix Index  results (β = .84, B = 1.450, * p = .000); Region- 
North East results (β = .125, B = 1.330, * p = .000); Region- South (β = .305, B = 3.707, * p = 
.000); Region- Midwest  (β = .225, B = 2.631 * p = .000). 
The variables that were not statistically significant and which were not good predictors of 
Patient Experience were Region- West (β = .033, B = .641, p = .125); Hospital Ownership 
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(DNonProfit) (β = -.008, B = -.086, p = .745); Teaching Intensity (β = .019, B = 1.192, p = .302 
(appendix MHR- Table 18). 
Table 22:Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Efficiency and Cost 
 
Variable β 
DRegion1NE β = -.332* 
DRegion2S β = -.374* 
DRegion3MW β = -.226* 
DRegion4W β = -.084* 
Location β = .145* 
DPrivate β = -.139* 
DNonProfit β = -.004 
Teaching Intensity β = -.005 
Case Mix Index β = -.166* 
HospitalSize β = -.165* 
 
Final Model (1) 
 
R2 = 20.6% 
 
 
 
               
* statistically significant at 5% level  
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Table 23: Hierarchical Regression DV 4 (Efficiency and Cost) 
 
                                                      
                                       Model 0                      Model 1 
 
(Constant) 9.028  17.269 
    
Region    
DRegion1NE -4.823  -5.011 
DRegion2S 6.364  6.454 
DRegion3MW 3.644  -3.77 
DRegion4W -2.78  -2.368 
 
Location    
Rural 1/Urban 
0 3.946  2.317 
 
Ownership    
DPrivate -2.263  -2.509 
DNonProfit -0.327  -0.057 
    
Teaching 
Intensity   -0.411 
Case Mix 
Index   -4.054 
HospitalSize   -0.005 
 
R2 0.134  0.206 
∆R2 -  0..072 
F 60.164  70.897 
∆F -  10.733 
        
                                        
 
Where: 
∆F =  (R22   -  R
2
1 ) / (k2  - k1 )  
  ___________________ 
 
   (1-R22) / (N – k2 – 1) 
 
F is statistically significant at 1% level (Appendix 3, table 78, F distribution critical values) 
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R21  is the value of R
2   for the first (smaller) model, R22  is the value of R
2 for the second (larger) 
model, k1  is the number of independent variables in the first model and k2  is the number of 
independent variables in the second model (Miles & Shelvin, 2001, p. 37). 
 
Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Efficiency and Cost 
 
All Independent variables were entered manually in the following order (Control 
Variables), Region (DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DRegion2MW, DRegion4W), Location (Rural) 
and Hospital Ownership (DPrivate and DNonProfit). The hierarchical multiple regression in 
model 0, displayed, Region, Location and Hospital ownership contributed significantly to the 
regression model, F (7, 2733) = 60.164, * p = .000) and accounted for 13.4% of the variation in 
Efficiency and Cost (appendix MHR- Table 19, Table 20). Introducing the independent variables 
in model 1 (Teaching intensity, Case Mix Index and Hospital size) explained an additional 
20.6% of variation in Efficiency and Cost and this change in R2 was significant F (10, 2730) = 
70.897, *p = .000.  
The statistically significant variables were Region- North East, South, Midwest, West; 
Location, Hospital ownership (DPrivate); Case Mix Index and Hospital size. With the South 
region generating the most intense beta value (β = –.374, B = -6.454, *p = .000). North East 
region with the second strongest beta (β = -.332, B = -5.011, *p = .000); Midwest region (β = -
.145, B = 2.317, * p = .000); Region- West (β = -0.84, B = -2.368, * p = .000); Location results 
(β = .125, B = 1.330, * p = .000); Hospital Ownership (DPrivate) (β = -.139, B = -2.509, * p = 
.000); Case mix index (β = -.166, B = -4.054 * p = .000), Hospital Size (β = -.165, B = -.005 * p 
= .000).. 
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The variables that were not statistically significant and which were not good predictors of 
Efficiency and Cost were Hospital Ownership (DNonProfit) (β = -.004, B = -.057, p = .876); 
Teaching Intensity (β = -.005, B = -.411, p = .798) (appendix MHR-Table 24). 
 
IV.3 Result Summary 
 
These results demonstrate a robust relationship between teaching intensity, hospital size 
and CMI and our variables of interest. In the following section discussed the significance of our 
results and provide an interpretation. Also discussed was the practical implications, limitations of 
the study and suggestions for future directions.  
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V Chapter 5: Discussion 
V.1 Discussion: Bivariate Analysis 
In this section, a bivariate analysis was conducted, and the relationship between each IV 
(teaching intensity, hospital size, and case mix index) on each DV (safety, clinical care, patient 
experience, and efficiency and cost) was evaluated to determine disparities between the two 
variables and whether results supported the existing literature.  
IV1: Teaching Intensity 
The analysis shows evidence that Teaching Intensity was a statistically significant 
predictor of Safety (DV1), Clinical care (DV2), and Patient experience (DV3). However, this 
did not hold for efficiency and cost (DV4). Results suggested that there was no association 
between teaching intensity and efficiency and cost. 
First, it was argued that teaching intensity influences safety. Teaching hospitals are 
considered innovators, forward-thinkers, and have up-to-date best practice standards, as medical 
residents are trained using the latest knowledge and concepts. Subsequently, this supports 
hospital teaching as a significant positive predictor of patient safety. Positive collaboration and 
teamwork in the healthcare system has proven to have successful outcomes on healthcare 
quality. Teamwork has become a major focus in healthcare. The impetus for this new interest in 
teamwork is the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report titled “To Err is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System”: 
…which details the high rate of preventable medical errors, many of which are the result 
of dysfunctional or nonexistent teamwork. The report suggests that teamwork requires 
effective patient management because of the increased specialization of tasks, the 
increased complexity and risks associated with treatment options, and the need to ensure 
appropriate healthcare outcomes and patient safety. As the report states:  
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…beyond their cost in human lives, preventable medical errors exact other significant 
tolls, total costs of between $17 billion and $29 billion per year, loss of trust in the 
health-care system by patients and diminished satisfaction by both patients and health 
professionals (Piollon, 1999). 
Results revealed that teaching intensity has a significant and negative influence on Safety 
(DV1).  Surprisingly, this finding does not agree with the literature (β= -.063, P=.001). As per 
the results, it is understood that the more medical residents that are being trained at a given 
hospital, patient safety is negatively impacted. It can be speculated that, instead of providers 
focusing on patients, the focus may be diverted in an effort to impart knowledge while the actual 
care of patients suffer. Further, it can also be speculated that in a teaching system perhaps the 
frequency of medical residents around patients may increase the possibility of infections, simply 
from proximity. Additionally, it can be assumed that there are weakened safety protocols at these 
medical facilities and although teaching hospitals provide highly specialized care, distinct 
guidelines have not been established to mitigate against patients’ risk of contracting infections. 
Second, it was argued that teaching intensity influences clinical care. The literature 
review supports the notion that teaching hospitals have lower mortality rates than non-teaching 
hospitals, which is further supported by the findings of this study. Iterating that teaching 
hospitals are said to be early adopters of technology and offer care that provides better 
outcomes; these hospitals are often more experienced in the treatment of various conditions 
(Datz, 2017).  
The third argument was that teaching intensity influences patient experience. Today, 
most teaching hospitals provide twenty-four-hour accessibility. Accessibility is one of the first 
steps to creating satisfactory patient experience. Results revealed that teaching intensity has a 
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significant and negative influence on patient experience (DV3).  Interestingly, this finding does 
not agree with the literature (β= -.52, P=.006).  
Previous literature highlights that teaching intensity boosts patient experience. 
Communication with nurses and doctors, responsiveness of hospital staff, communication about 
medication, hospital cleanliness and quietness, discharge information, care transition, and 
hospital overall rating all play a vital role interfacing with this measure. Newly trained medical 
residents are usually the first in line to encounter and have any interaction with the patients.  
Based on findings, it is understood that the higher the number of medical residents being 
trained at a given hospital, patient experience is negatively impacted. It can be speculated that 
the goal of healthcare providers is not to ensure that patients have a value-based experience 
during hospital visits or stay but rather the focus is on teaching medical residents (junior 
doctors). It can be presumed that hospitals with inexperienced trainees or shortage of senior staff 
results in more disintegrated patient experience and decreased quality of care. Further, it can also 
be speculated that teaching hospitals are larger and more solvent in nature, thus the focus is not 
on providing a customer- centric environment but rather exemplary medical/treatment outcomes. 
Finally, the results interpreted that teaching intensity does not influences efficiency and 
cost. This result is supported by previous literature pointing out that teaching medical residents 
negatively impact productivity of other hospital output, thereby raising cost or reducing revenue 
(Grosskopf et al., 2001). 
IV2: Hospital Size 
First, results revealed hospital size has a significant and negative influence on safety 
(DV1). Astonishingly, this finding does not support the literature (β= -.187, P=.000). As per 
results, it is understood for every unit increase in hospital size, safety is being impacted 
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negatively. It can be speculated that the larger a hospital’s capacity the less likely it is providers 
will adhere to safety protocols, thus increasing the risk of patient infections. It can also be 
presumed hospitals that are stretched beyond its capacity can cause frustration among physicians 
having a negative impact on their productivity, which in turn impacts incentivization. Further, it 
can be speculated that infections can easily be contracted from patient to patient due to 
overcrowding. Having a safety culture to mitigate incidents that can be associated with patient 
injuries and even cause death is a critical component of any healthcare facility. 
Second, results revealed hospital size has a significant and positive influence on clinical 
care. Like teaching hospitals, larger hospitals are generally considered to be heavily invested in 
advanced technology, which in turn contributes to mitigating risk associated with clinical 
care/mortality which is supported by the literature. 
Third, results revealed hospital size has a significant and negative influence on patient 
experience. Patient satisfaction has been seen as a key criterion when evaluating hospitals and is 
one of the main focus of the current healthcare reform. There has been a large strand of 
literature aimed at identifying the relationship between hospital structure and patient satisfaction 
in developed countries. Most of these studies have shown higher staff‐to‐patient ratio and better 
hospital environments were associated with higher patient rates (Linlin et al., 2019).   
Interestingly, findings (β= -.295, P=.000) does not agree with previous literature. As per 
results it can be understood for every unit increase in hospital size, patient experience is being 
impacted negatively. This can be as a result of a very slow hospital system, meaning, as patients 
go from one area to the next there is a lack of service within the hospital system. Leaders need 
to optimize strategic alignment to allow a smoother and more efficient workflow which in turn 
can have a positive impact on the patient experience. Additionally, satisfactory patient 
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experience is one that involves a reasonable amount of communication between medical staff 
and patients. It can be hypothesized that in larger hospitals, providers are thinly stretched and 
will find it difficult to maintain the degree of contact required for the proper transmission of 
information between the provider and the patient, as well as between the provider and the health 
care administrators. Relevant information may be lost during the process, which may result in a 
delay in care delivery. Also, confidentiality may be compromised as well as misdiagnosis of 
care, or providers may be faced with complex decisions on whose life to save when not 
everyone can be saved (triage approach). 
Finally, results suggest hospital size has a significant and negative influence on efficiency 
and cost. Hospital size has long been an area of discussion and debate in the U.S. healthcare 
industry. Questions have consistently focused on cost management or efficiency in large versus 
small hospitals. A persistent question among researchers is whether efficiencies are associated 
with larger facilities through economies of scale or if there are alternate scenarios that play a 
significant part in hospital efficiency and cost (Coyne et al.,2009). The results are consistent with 
earlier publications.  
IV3: Case Mix Index 
Case Mixed Index considers the severity of the patient's condition and subsequent 
treatment. This means that the more advanced a hospital is in terms of innovation and processes; 
the more they are equipped to promote quality safety measures. An increase in survival rate, 
provide satisfactory patient experience and increase efficiency and cost. Providers make it their 
duty to report their CMI as this is a strong indicator of how well their institution is performing 
financially. 
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Results revealed case mix index has a significant and negative influence on safety and 
efficiency and cost (DV1 and DV4). Surprisingly, this finding for DV1 does not support the 
literature. As per the results, it is understood that the more severe cases handled by a hospital and 
the variety of patients that are being dealt with, negatively impacts patient safety (β= -.0206, 
P=.000). Based on the above discussion on hospital size and safety the same speculation for 
findings on case mix index and safety can be used to explain the outcomes. In addition, the 
literature supports efficiency and cost findings, with the case mix index having a significant and 
negative influence on safety. The more severe cases are handled by a hospital, the more 
resources are being used by that facility.  
Finally, results revealed more severe cases handled by a hospital and the variety of 
patients that are being dealt with, positively impacts clinical care and patient experience, these 
two findings are supported by the literature. 
V.2 Discussion: Multivariate Analysis 
As a means of assessing the stability of bivariate findings a multivariate analysis on IVs 
and DVs was conducted. Hence an evaluation was completed measuring the relationship 
between all IVs (teaching intensity, hospital size, and case mix index) on each DV (safety, 
clinical care, patient experience, and efficiency and cost) allowing for an inference on whether 
the results back up existing literature. 
Multivariate analysis presents a more unambiguous result among variables. Using 
multivariate analysis helped identify certain characteristics among constructs quickly. This 
analysis gave an overview of the associations between two or more variables.   
In examining the influence above and beyond the first group of independent variables 
(teaching intensity, hospital size and case mix index) and to statistically control for three 
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variables (Region, location, and hospital ownership) a hierarchical linear regression was carried 
out. This test examined whether adding variables significantly enhanced the model’s capability 
to predict the criterion variable. 
Multivariate Analysis: Safety 
Results supported teaching intensity (IV1) has a statistically positive impact on safety 
which is supported by previous literature. On the other hand, both the hospital size and the case 
mix index have significant and negative impacts on safety, as can be seen in Table 16, and the 
same speculations from bivariate safety results can be used to justify this result, since this is not 
confirmed by the literature. (Hospital size: β= -.187, P=.000) (Case Mix Index β= -.0206, 
P=.000). 
Recall from the hierarchical analysis were four IVs that were statistically significant 
predictors of safety: Region-West, location, case mix index and hospital size. The findings 
supported the literature that rural hospitals in the western region that handle patients with severe 
conditions produced better safety scores than hospitals in other regions. In December 2018, the 
Leapfrog group conducted an annual hospital evaluation recognizing hospitals for excellence in 
hospital quality, patient safety and efficiency in which seventeen rural hospitals in California 
received awards (The 118 'Top Hospitals' in the US, according to The Leapfrog Group, 2018). 
The IVs, Teaching intensity, hospital ownership (private and nonprofit) and the 
Midwest, south and northeast regions were not significant predictors of safety. All listed IVs 
have a negative association with safety. Results indicated that private and nonprofit hospital 
scores were lower as opposed to government owned, rural medical facilities. This result is 
substantiated since value-based purchasing is a Centers of Medicare and Medicaid services, 
government run program. 
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Multivariate Analysis: Clinical care 
The multivariate analysis showed that teaching intensity, hospital size and case mix 
index all have significant and positive impact on clinical care. This finding is supported in the 
previous literature. 
In reference to the hierarchical analysis, four IVs were statistically significant predictors 
of clinical care: Region-West and South; location, case mix index, and hospital ownership. 
Results indicated that rural hospitals in the western and southern regions have the lowest 
mortality scores. This is no surprise as Florida and California were the top two hospitals 
rewarded as announced by Health Leaders media report for FY 2018. The IVs, Teaching 
intensity and region Northeast and Midwest are not significant predictors of clinical care (The 
118 'Top Hospitals' in the US, according to The Leapfrog Group, 2018). 
Multivariate Analysis: Patient Experience 
The multivariate analysis showed that teaching intensity and hospital size had a 
statistical and negative impact on patient experience. This can be seen in Table 16 and this can 
draw upon the same speculations from the bivariate findings as it relates to safety since this 
finding is not supported in the literature (Teaching Intensity: β= -.011, P=.000) (Hospital Size 
β= -.295, P=.000). In addition, case mix index exhibited a statistical and positive impact on 
patient experience. This finding is supported by previous literature. 
As per the hierarchical analysis, five IVs were statistically significant predictors of 
patient experience: Region-Northeast, South, Midwest; location and hospital ownership- Private, 
case mix index, and hospital size. Results revealed that rural, private hospitals in the northeast, 
south, and Midwest region had more satisfactory patient experience scores. Public hospitals are 
funded by the Government and are guided by governmental rules and regulations, while private 
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hospitals are not bound by the same and offer more personalized care and treatment to their 
patients. Moreover, private hospitals have more money to maintain patients and offer the best 
quality of service than their counterparts. 
Numerous comparative studies have suggested the differences in healthcare services 
provided by private hospitals result in higher rates of patient satisfaction. Results of this study 
shows that patients prefer to visit private over public hospitals because of multiple factors such 
as improved technology, reduced wait time and delay in treatment, sterile environment, and 
personalized care from physician and nurses (Irfan & Ijaz, 2011). In systems where private 
hospitals are not funded by public financing, they are more directed towards earning profits by 
focusing on service quality, hence, patients search for private care only because of perceptions 
of better facilities and excellence (Fatima, Malik, & Shabbir, 2018). The IVs, Teaching 
intensity, and Region-western and hospital ownership (nonprofit) are not significant predictors 
of patient experience. Although the Western region delivered on having favorable safety and 
clinical care scores, it is patient experience scores being impacted negatively. This can be as a 
result of government owned healthcare facilities. Previous studies have also indicated that 
patients select private hospitals only because they are not satisfied with public healthcare 
providers. They are compelled to spend more money in order to get desired service quality 
(Fatima, Malik, & Shabbir, 2018). 
Multivariate Analysis: Efficiency and cost 
The multivariate analysis showed that hospital size and case mix index had a statistical 
and negative impact on efficiency and cost (Hospital Size: β= -.213, P=.000) (Case Mix Index 
β= -.147, P=.000). This finding is supported by the literature. In addition, the results from 
teaching intensity revealed a statistical and positive impact on efficiency and cost. This finding 
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is not supported in the literature. It can be speculated that healthcare administrators plan and 
budget medical residents teaching and training in accordance with efficient usage of resources 
(teaching intensity decreases efficiency and cost). Another factor to be considered is the 
allocation of insufficient time for medical training that can lead to an over utilization of 
resources. For example, overtime and unplanning trainings of medical residents may maximize 
associated cost. 
In reference to hierarchical analysis, there were five IVs that were statistically significant 
predictors to efficiency and cost: Region-Northeast, South, Midwest, and West; location and 
hospital ownership- Private, case mix index, and hospital size. Results suggested throughout all 
regions, there were satisfactory efficiency and cost results. These results are more prevalent 
among hospitals that handle and treat severe medical conditions.  
The IVs, Teaching intensity, and hospital ownership (nonprofit) were not significant 
predictors of Efficiency and cost. Through the analysis of the study, it was observed that 
teaching intensity had a negative impact on efficiency and cost. Again, this can be based on the 
result of physicians spending more time and resources training residents than attending patients. 
V.3 Discussion Summary 
 
The findings endorsed the starting assumptions. The study was aimed at exploring and 
making a comparative review of bivariate and multivariate data processing. The comparison 
between bivariate and multivariate approach in this study revealed a smaller number of 
significant independent variables with multivariate analysis. As a researcher, the bivariate and 
multivariate methods must be used as complementary methods, as they are not equivalent in all 
cases. 
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Based on the Bivariate analysis (Tables 9-12) all relationships between all independent 
variables (IV 1- IV3) with dependent variables (DV 1- DV4) were statistically significant except 
for the relationship between Teaching intensity and efficiency and cost (DV1 and DV4). In 
assessing the collective effect of independent variables, after conducting multivariate analysis 
predictably all relationships were statistically significant. As a result, the research question was 
answered, and the null hypotheses was rejected. 
The motivations for this study were high cost-low quality in healthcare, organizational 
inefficiencies, and healthcare access. The U.S. healthcare delivery system has endured numerous 
changes over the past few decades in an effort to making healthcare affordable for all.  
Healthcare accessibility. As per the findings, hospital size has a significant and positive 
influence on clinical care, implying that the larger a hospital the greater the survival rate of 
patients. This shows that accessibility to healthcare for acute and complex conditions is vital to 
achieving the best outcomes for citizens. The U.S. healthcare system must be able to 
accommodate citizens for entry into the care system without barriers. Ideally, all hospitals 
(government, private etc.) should be competent in terms of its structure, process, and outcomes; 
striving to allow access and deliver quality of care for all. The impetus is on policy makers to 
design and implement national healthcare programs that will allow access to all citizens no 
matter race or socio-economic status. 
Organizational Inefficiencies. Successful patient experience and safety measures are related to 
major efficient clinical processes and outcomes. Organizational inefficiencies impede the entire 
healthcare delivery process. Long hospital stays, poor collaboration among medical staff and 
hospital administrators as well as shortage of staff aid in impeding proper patient care.  As per 
the findings, hospital size negatively correlates with safety and patient experience. It is with 
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urgent need for policy makers to implement clear, strategic alignments for healthcare 
sustainability and to seal loopholes that are experienced during inpatients care.  
High Cost- Low Quality. Patient experience assessments can expose major system issues, such 
as delays in returning test results and communication deficiencies that can have wide impacts on 
quality, safety, and overall performance. The study showed that teaching hospitals have a 
statistical negative correlation with patient experience. While teaching hospitals have the best in 
innovation and more financial resources available the focus of quality seems to be diminishing.  
As opposed to other industrialized countries the US has an imbalance healthcare system, where 
high cost- low quality is prevalent across all States. The economic and social benefits are 
obvious, and there is a need to concentrate even more on investing and enhancing quality in 
order to build faith in the healthcare system which, can be achieved only through access to high-
quality, people-centered health services for all (Wilson, Hartl, & Palan, 2018).  
V.4 Practical implication 
This research has contributed as an empirical model for hospital performance that 
assesses healthcare institutions and patients' scores with respect to quality maintenance; 
moreover, it presents findings that allow for successful implementation and sustainability of 
value-based care and operations within the healthcare system. Subsequently, this study is 
beneficial to policymakers, hospital administrators, medical professionals, and researchers; it 
can also be useful for any business association. Additionally, this study adds to the body of 
knowledge by evaluating each measure of the value-based purchasing program and learning 
about other factors that influence quality care, the structure, process, and outcome. This research 
also highlights that government-owned hospitals can successfully increase their customer 
fulfillment measures by addressing elements that can produce immediate and improved patient 
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satisfaction. 
V.5 Limitation and future research 
Further research can be conducted to address data gathering approaches and accuracy. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of researchers and industry experts in carrying out timely studies 
reflecting emerging medical changes and program adjustments, the gaps identified in the 
literature demonstrate that there are critical areas of VBP programs that still need to be 
evaluated. Public reporting on value-based purchasing systems use measures of quality based on 
averages or rankings of observed quality scores (Blumenthal, 2013). These methods provide a 
limited amount of information on how well hospitals are performing (Med-dings and McMahon 
2008). A method that provides information about how closely each hospital approaches its own 
best possible quality scores (alternatively, best possible outcomes) could provide additional 
information, especially to payers (Unruh & Hofler, 2016). 
Furthermore, over the years, the measures of the value-based purchasing program have 
been modified frequently. This does not allow for a consistent performance assessment of 
hospitals. Also, the value-based purchasing measure should not be the same across hospitals as 
each hospital has its own characteristics. Possibly, medical facilities should be grouped 
according to their characteristics and, on this basis, be incentivized accordingly. For this 
incentive specifically (VBP), only the results of Medicare patients should be accounted for in the 
patient experience measure. The HCAHPS (hospital consumer assessment of healthcare 
providers and systems) survey is not restricted to Medicare beneficiaries. The random sample 
selection should consist of only Medicare recipients, as unbiased selection may inflate patient 
experience scores. In order to refine the program, it will be extremely advantageous to know how 
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their overall hospital visit impacts this group Medicare beneficiaries (Hospital Patient - Survey 
of patients' experiences (HCAHPS), 2020). 
The efficiency and cost measure needs to be revised. Currently, efficiency and cost are 
measured by the Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary (MSPB), which shows how much Medicare 
spends on a particular episode per patient. These only measures cost, that pinpoints to the 
limitation of the VBP program, which fails to measure efficiency or at the very least define 
efficiency in a measurable manner. A more suitable tool, such as applying a cost performance 
index (CPI), would be more favorable. The CPI is one of the key indicators of the earned value 
management system. This index can be applied to evaluate the value of care. Output measured: 
the amount of completed work for every unit of cost spent.  
The current study is focused on healthcare and a government-run program; however, future 
studies can be done to evaluate similar private sector programs in other industries. In addition, an 
exploratory qualitative study assessing reward programs would be value-added to the body of 
existing literature.  
V.6 Conclusion 
An exploratory analysis was paramount to this research as the identification of gaps in the 
body of literature emphasized the need for the applied methodology. Multiple value-based 
purchasing programs run concurrently within hospitals that may have impacted hospital 
performance in areas yet to be recognized. 
As mentioned in the literature review the concept of value in the health care system plays 
a key role in medical practice. The concept of value refers to the output achieved relative to the 
cost incurred in which, value is defined as the patient health outcomes achieved per dollar spent 
(Porter, 2010). In measuring hospital performance value-based purchasing uses the following six 
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strategies: 1) collecting information and data on quality, 2) selective contracting with high-
quality plans or providers, 3) partnering with plans or providers to improve quality, 4) promoting 
Six-Sigma quality - streamlining quality control, 5) educating consumers on quality issues, and 
6) rewarding or penalizing plans or providers through use of incentives or disincentives ( (Maio, 
Goldfarb, & Carter, 2003). 
In reviewing the literature and industry practices in hospital performance in relation to 
value-based purchasing programs the following gaps were identified: 
Data Quality Assurance. Value-based purchasing measures result from the collection of data by 
hospitals. Data quality is vital to incentives and disincentives management and distribution. The 
body of the literature lacks studies on hospital data collection procedures and reporting 
techniques. A review and assessment of data quality management in hospital information 
gathering would serve to identify inconsistencies across hospital reporting and promote 
standardization, as recommended in limitation this should done by grouping hospitals according 
to their characteristics. Basic questions remain about whether value-based purchasing have 
improved quality and efficiency for Medicare (Ryan, 2013); given the lack of research-based 
support for data quality assurance, this raises questions about the mechanism used to determine a 
hospital's chances of being unfairly incentivized or penalized. 
Studies on selection of plans and providers. There is a lack of transparency in selecting plans 
and providers who participate in value-based purchasing programs. Limited academic and 
technical research that addresses the selection process should be of concern. Research is needed 
to determine whether participating insurance plans are helpful to patients. Lack of research in 
this area can serve as evidence of a lack of awareness of how patient care is influenced by 
insurance schemes and their relationships with providers. Health insurers, like other insurance 
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schemes, seek to save a dollar at every turn, and while the value in care is promoted as the basis 
for VBP programs, financial rewards are still a heavily motivating factor in hospital data 
reporting. 
Multiple Value-Based Purchasing Programs. After years of small-scale pilot projects, 
demonstrations, and experiments, the Affordable Care Act mandated that Medicare 
payment to hospitals and physicians must depend, in part, on metrics of quality and efficiency 
(Ryan, 2013). However, VBP involve many programs that operate simultaneously. The literature 
does not speak to the monitoring of these programs that raises the question of how the programs 
affect each other. The monitoring of each program and the overall impact on hospital 
performance would support and promote VBP programs, as monitoring optimizes hospital 
operations through structural management; thus, promotes the achievement of the VBP 
objective, which is financial incentives to improve quality and efficiency (Ryan, 2013). 
As U.S. health care systems moved toward a value-based and patient-centred approach in 
response to high costs and low-quality health care, accompanying scholarly and sectoral 
publications have followed. Literature on hospital Value-Based Purchasing programs concentrate 
on broadening readers' awareness of VBP programs, reviewing performance measures, assessing 
hospital operations, highlighting impacts of VBP programs, and reviewing and recommending 
policy reforms to meet emerging needs of the medical community. One can argue that the 
relatively narrow scope that the body of literature covers could be attributed to the complexities 
of value-based purchasing programs. Readjustments to VBP programs in hospitals pose a 
challenge for academics and industry experts to study and produce relevant content across the 
wide range of VBP programs.   
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The purpose of this study was to understand the factors that influence hospital 
performance, i.e., safety, clinical care, patient experience, efficiency and cost as measured by 
teaching intensity, hospital size and the case mix index. The findings showed that there exists a 
significant impact on hospital performance, which correlates with previous studies. The literature 
has made it clear that while rewards can significantly boost quality patient care, stakeholders 
must understand and agree that quality care will not be achieved without obstacles and openness 
to reforming policies and practices. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Table 25: Correlation between variables in this study. 
 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed). 
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Appendix 2 
 
Simple Regression Model 1 
 
                 
 
 Table 26 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .063a .004 .004 5.614983 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 322.805 1 322.805 10.239 .001b 
Residual 81027.062 2570 31.528   
Total 81349.867 2571    
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity 
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Table 28 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta   
1 (Constant) 11.124 .112  99.151 .000 
Teaching Intensity -4.325 1.352 -.063 -3.200 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
 
 
 
 
Table 29 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .295a .087 .087 5.375998 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize 
 
 
 
 
Table 30 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7073.389 1 7073.389 244.742 .000b 
Residual 74276.478 2570 28.901   
Total 81349.867 2571    
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize 
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Table 31 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 13.001 .163  79.813 .000 
HospitalSize -.007 .000 -.295 -15.644 .000 
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
 
 
 
Table 32 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .304a .093 .092 5.352163 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index 
 
 
 
 
Table 33 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7500.457 1 7500.457 261.836 .000b 
Residual 73447.455 2564 28.646   
Total 80947.912 2565    
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index 
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Table 34 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 21.342 .644  33.143 .000 
Case Mix Index -6.293 .389 -.304 -16.181 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
 
Simple Regression Model 2 
Table 35 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .045a .002 .002 4.996908 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity 
 
Table 36 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 135.584 1 135.584 5.430 .020b 
Residual 67566.347 2706 24.969   
Total 67701.932 2707    
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity 
 
Table 37 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 13.817 .097  142.324 .000 
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Teaching Intensity 3.009 1.291 .045 2.330 .020 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
 
Table 38 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .179a .032 .032 4.920632 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Hospital Size 
 
 
 
Table 39 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2159.704 1 2159.704 89.197 .000b 
Residual 65543.549 2707 24.213   
Total 67703.253 2708    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize 
 
 
Table 40 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 12.856 .141  90.862 .000 
HospitalSize .004 .000 .179 9.444 .000 
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
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Table 41 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .232a .054 .053 4.865979 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index 
 
 
 
Table 42 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3626.695 1 3626.695 153.169 .000b 
Residual 64024.639 2704 23.678   
Total 67651.334 2705    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index 
 
Table 43 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7.420 .528  14.061 .000 
Case Mix Index 4.007 .324 .232 12.376 .000 
 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
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Simple Regression Model 3 
 
Table 44 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .052a .003 .002 5.048988 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity 
 
 
 
Table 45 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 194.227 1 194.227 7.619 .006b 
Residual 70690.086 2773 25.492   
Total 70884.313 2774    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity 
 
Table 46 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 9.152 .097  94.316 .000 
Teaching Intensity -3.351 1.214 -.052 -2.760 .006 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
b.  
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Table 47 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .294a .086 .086 4.840182 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 48 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6138.734 1 6138.734 262.033 .000b 
Residual 64987.504 2774 23.427   
Total 71126.238 2775    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize 
 
 
 
Table 49 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 10.772 .138  78.334 .000 
HospitalSize -.006 .000 -.294 -16.187 .000 
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a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
 
 
 
Table 50 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .152a .023 .023 4.996847 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index 
 
 
Table 51 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1635.949 1 1635.949 65.521 .000b 
Residual 69087.789 2767 24.968   
Total 70723.738 2768    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index 
 
 
Table 52 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 13.342 .532  25.067 .000 
Case Mix Index -2.635 .326 -.152 -8.094 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
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Simple Regression Model 4 
Table 53 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .015a .000 .000 7.121887 
 
 
                                           a. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity 
 
 
 
 
Table 54 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 33.547 1 33.547 .661 .416b 
Residual 141106.602 2782 50.721   
Total 141140.150 2783    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity 
 
 
 
Table 55 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5.367 .137  39.275 .000 
Teaching Intensity -1.393 1.712 -.015 -.813 .416 
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a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
 
 
 
Table 56 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .284a .081 .081 6.827771 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize 
 
 
Table 57 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 11422.623 1 11422.623 245.024 .000b 
Residual 129739.148 2783 46.618   
Total 141161.771 2784    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize 
 
Table 58 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7.605 .194  39.283 .000 
HospitalSize -.008 .001 -.284 -15.653 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
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Table 59 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .253a .064 .064 6.896473 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index 
 
 
Table 60 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9019.573 1 9019.573 189.641 .000b 
Residual 132030.296 2776 47.561   
Total 141049.869 2777    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index 
 
 
 
Table 61 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 15.270 .732  20.869 .000 
Case Mix Index -6.168 .448 -.253 -13.771 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
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Appendix 3 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
    Table 62 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .343a .118 .117 5.280030 
 
                             a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching 
Intensity, Hospital Size 
 
Table 63 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9522.642 3 3174.214 113.858 .000b 
Residual 71425.270 2562 27.879   
Total 80947.912 2565    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size 
 
 
Table 64 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 19.227 .688  27.940 .000 
Teaching Intensity .075 1.295 .001 .058 .954 
HospitalSize -.004 .001 -.187 -8.510 .000 
Case Mix Index -4.250 .457 -.206 -9.301 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
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Multivariate Analysis # 2 
 
         Table 65 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .240a .057 .056 4.857819 
 
                             a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching 
Intensity, Hospital Size 
 
Table 66 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3888.448 3 1296.149 54.925 .000b 
Residual 63762.886 2702 23.598   
Total 67651.334 2705    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size 
 
Table 67 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 8.144 .573  14.218 .000 
Teaching Intensity .100 1.276 .001 .078 .938 
HospitalSize .002 .000 .074 3.319 .001 
Case Mix Index 3.298 .389 .191 8.477 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
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Multivariate Analysis # 3 
 
Table 68 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .293a .086 .085 4.834836 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size 
 
 
Table 69 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6090.104 3 2030.035 86.844 .000b 
Residual 64633.634 2765 23.376   
Total 70723.738 2768    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size 
 
Table 70 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 10.576 .556  19.033 .000 
Teaching Intensity -.687 1.184 -.011 -.580 .562 
HospitalSize -.006 .000 -.295 -13.735 .000 
Case Mix Index .124 .375 .007 .331 .741 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .312a .097 .096 6.775126 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, HospitalSize 
 
 
Table 72 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 13716.793 3 4572.264 99.609 .000b 
Residual 127333.076 2774 45.902   
Total 141049.869 2777    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size 
 
 
 
Table 73 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 12.763 .776  16.456 .000 
Teaching Intensity 3.777 1.659 .042 2.277 .023 
Hospital Size -.006 .001 -.213 -9.972 .000 
Case Mix Index -3.586 .524 -.147 -6.844 .000 
 
 
Multivariate Analysis #4 
 
Table 71 
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a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
Multi Collinearity 
 
      Table 74 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 19.227 .688  27.940 .000   
Teaching 
Intensity 
.075 1.295 .001 .058 .954 .963 1.038 
HospitalSize -.004 .001 -.187 -8.510 .000 .717 1.396 
Case Mix Index -4.250 .457 -.206 -9.301 .000 .705 1.418 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
 
 
      Table 75 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 8.144 .573  14.218 .000   
Teaching 
Intensity 
.100 1.276 .001 .078 .938 .967 1.034 
HospitalSize .002 .000 .074 3.319 .001 .696 1.436 
Case Mix Index 3.298 .389 .191 8.477 .000 .690 1.448 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
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  Table 76 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 10.576 .556  19.033 .000   
Teaching 
Intensity 
-.687 1.184 -.011 -.580 .562 .964 1.037 
HospitalSize -.006 .000 -.295 -13.735 .000 .714 1.400 
Case Mix Index .124 .375 .007 .331 .741 .706 1.417 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
 
 
 
      Table 77 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardiz
ed 
Coefficient
s 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Toleranc
e VIF 
1 (Constant) 12.763 .776  16.456 .000   
Teaching 
Intensity 
3.777 1.659 .042 2.277 .023 .964 1.037 
HospitalSize -.006 .001 -.213 -9.972 .000 .714 1.401 
Case Mix 
Index 
-3.586 .524 -.147 -6.844 .000 .705 1.418 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
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Table 78- F Distribution Critical Values 
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Multivariate Hierarchical Regression Tables 
MHR- Table 1 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .182a .033 .031 5.529533 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion4W, 
DRegion2S, DPrivate, DRegion3MW 
MHR- Table 2 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2656.829 7 379.547 12.413 .000b 
Residual 77326.039 2529 30.576   
Total 79982.868 2536    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion4W, DRegion2S, DPrivate, 
DRegion3MW 
 
MHR- Table 3 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 12.580 .450  27.979 .000 
DRegion1NE -.150 .352 -.013 -.427 .670 
DRegion2S .113 .392 .008 .288 .773 
DRegion3MW .344 .375 .026 .919 .358 
DRegion4W .773 .510 .036 1.515 .130 
Location -2.158 .258 -.168 -8.377 .000 
DPrivate .442 .392 .031 1.129 .259 
DNonProfit -.147 .330 -.012 -.444 .657 
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a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
MHR- Table 4 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .359a .129 .126 5.251346 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion2S, Teaching Intensity, DRegion4W, 
DPrivate, Location, DRegion3MW, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE 
 
 
MHR- Table 5 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 10324.280 10 1032.428 37.439 .000b 
Residual 69658.588 2526 27.577   
Total 79982.868 2536    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion2S, Teaching Intensity, DRegion4W, DPrivate, 
Location, DRegion3MW, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE 
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MHR- Table 6 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 19.711 .818  24.103 .000 
DRegion1NE -.380 .345 -.032 -1.102 .271 
DRegion2S .149 .381 .011 .391 .696 
DRegion3MW .171 .364 .013 .468 .640 
DRegion4W 1.199 .487 .055 2.462 .014 
Location -.733 .260 -.057 -2.824 .005 
DPrivate .144 .377 .010 .382 .702 
DNonProfit .057 .317 .005 .181 .856 
Teaching Intensity .051 1.325 .001 .039 .969 
Case Mix Index -4.339 .488 -.210 -8.883 .000 
HospitalSize -.004 .001 -.167 -7.357 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Safety 
 
 
MHR- Table 7 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .257a .066 .063 4.826687 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, 
DPrivate, DRegion3MW 
 
 
 
 
 114 
 
MHR- Table 8 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4375.017 7 625.002 26.828 .000b 
Residual 61969.782 2660 23.297   
Total 66344.799 2667    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DPrivate, 
DRegion3MW 
 
 
MHR- Table 9 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 11.925 .385  30.952 .000 
DRegion1NE -.367 .314 -.035 -1.171 .242 
DRegion2S -1.765 .341 -.146 -5.173 .000 
DRegion3MW -.440 .333 -.038 -1.323 .186 
DRegion4W -.653 .448 -.033 -1.458 .145 
Location 1.784 .213 .161 8.361 .000 
DPrivate 1.399 .327 .111 4.275 .000 
DNonProfit 1.568 .277 .149 5.670 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
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MHR- Table 10 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .309a .096 .092 4.751717 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, DPrivate, 
Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE 
 
 
MHR- Table 11 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6352.894 10 635.289 28.137 .000b 
Residual 59991.904 2657 22.579   
Total 66344.799 2667    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Hospital Size, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, DPrivate, Location, 
DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE 
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MHR- Table 12 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 8.301 .689  12.039 .000 
DRegion1NE -.175 .318 -.017 -.550 .582 
DRegion2S -1.634 .344 -.136 -4.753 .000 
DRegion3MW -.310 .334 -.027 -.926 .354 
DRegion4W -.851 .443 -.043 -1.920 .055 
Location 1.036 .225 .093 4.605 .000 
DPrivate 1.468 .325 .117 4.515 .000 
DNonProfit 1.418 .275 .135 5.164 .000 
Teaching Intensity .481 1.280 .007 .376 .707 
Case Mix Index 2.311 .415 .134 5.570 .000 
HospitalSize .002 .000 .075 3.286 .001 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care 
 
 
 
MHR- Table 13 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .297a .088 .086 4.794826 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, 
DPrivate, DRegion3MW 
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MHR- Table 14 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6078.110 7 868.301 37.768 .000b 
Residual 62602.741 2723 22.990   
Total 68680.851 2730    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DPrivate, 
DRegion3MW 
 
 
 
MHR- Table 15 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7.340 .339  21.660 .000 
DRegion1NE .771 .299 .073 2.574 .010 
DRegion2S 3.186 .328 .262 9.719 .000 
DRegion3MW 2.270 .319 .194 7.126 .000 
DRegion4W .711 .434 .036 1.639 .101 
Location  1.626 .211 .145 7.709 .000 
DPrivate -1.035 .322 -.082 -3.219 .001 
DNonProfit -.086 .272 -.008 -.315 .753 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
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MHR- Table 16 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .408a .166 .163 4.588646 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, 
Teaching Intensity, DPrivate, Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, 
DNonProfit, DRegion1NE 
 
 
 
MHR- Table 17 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 11409.422 10 1140.942 54.187 .000b 
Residual 57271.428 2720 21.056   
Total 68680.851 2730    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, DPrivate, 
Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE 
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MHR- Table 18 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t 
Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta  
1 (Constant) 6.690 .681  9.821 .000 
DRegion1NE 1.330 .295 .125 4.505 .000 
DRegion2S 3.707 .321 .305 11.555 .000 
DRegion3MW 2.631 .311 .225 8.451 .000 
DRegion4W .641 .417 .033 1.536 .125 
Location  .988 .216 .088 4.571 .000 
DPrivate -1.455 .311 -.115 -4.671 .000 
DNonProfit -.086 .263 -.008 -.326 .745 
Teaching Intensity 1.192 1.155 .019 1.032 .302 
Case Mix Index 1.450 .387 .084 3.743 .000 
HospitalSize -.007 .000 -.326 -15.216 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience 
 
 
MHR- Table 19 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .365a .134 .131 6.655858 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, 
DPrivate, DRegion3MW 
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MHR- Table 20 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 18657.014 7 2665.288 60.164 .000b 
Residual 121073.109 2733 44.300   
Total 139730.123 2740    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DPrivate, 
DRegion3MW 
 
MHR- Table 21 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 9.028 .469  19.254 .000 
DRegion1NE -4.823 .414 -.319 -11.643 .000 
DRegion2S -6.364 .454 -.368 -14.033 .000 
DRegion3MW -3.644 .441 -.219 -8.263 .000 
DRegion4W -2.780 .601 -.099 -4.621 .000 
Location  3.946 .292 .247 13.492 .000 
DPrivate -2.263 .445 -.126 -5.089 .000 
DNonProfit -.327 .376 -.022 -.870 .384 
                                            a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
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MHR- Table 22 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .454a .206 .203 6.374278 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, 
DPrivate, Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE 
 
 
 
MHR- Table 23 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 28806.335 10 2880.633 70.897 .000b 
Residual 110923.789 2730 40.631   
Total 139730.123 2740    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, DPrivate, 
Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE 
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MHR- Table 24 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 17.269 .941  18.349 .000 
DRegion1NE -5.011 .409 -.332 -12.258 .000 
DRegion2S -6.454 .444 -.374 -14.534 .000 
DRegion3MW -3.770 .431 -.226 -8.743 .000 
DRegion4W -2.368 .579 -.084 -4.092 .000 
Location  2.317 .300 .145 7.728 .000 
DPrivate -2.509 .431 -.139 -5.820 .000 
DNonProfit -.057 .364 -.004 -.156 .876 
Teaching Intensity -.411 1.604 -.005 -.256 .798 
Case Mix Index -4.054 .536 -.166 -7.561 .000 
HospitalSize -.005 .001 -.165 -7.878 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost 
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